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Assessing the Issue of Arbitrariness in Capital Sentencing in North Carolina:
Are the Effects of Legally Relevant Variables Racially Invariant?
Judith Kavanaugh Earl
ABSTRACT
This study analyzed case and sentencing data from 632 capital cases involving
Black and White defendants and victims, processed in North Carolina from May 1990
through December 2002. Logistic regression analysis of all cases and race-specific data
allowed assessment of the variable effects of jury acceptance of statutory aggravating and
mitigating factors on capital sentencing outcomes (death versus life). The purpose was to
evaluate the role race plays in shaping jury use of legally defined factors in capital
sentencing. Significant variance in the effect of jury acceptance of aggravators was
observed between Black and White defendants. Black defendants pay a higher premium
in terms of the risk of a death sentence than do White defendants whose crimes are
comparably aggravated. There was no overall disparity in the effect of jury acceptance of
mitigatory factors observed, although certain mitigators reduced the risk of a death
sentence significantly more for Black or White. Overall, the aggravators had a
statistically significantly stronger effect on sentencing outcomes than did the mitigators,
regardless of race, and on cases involving Black defendants, regardless of victim race.
Racial invariance was not shown.
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Chapter One
Introduction
It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one
defendant is "unusual" if it discriminates against him by reason of his race,
religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a
procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), DOUGLAS, J., concurring.

The primary purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which the ‘guided
discretion’ approach to death sentencing under the seminal holding in Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238(1972) has achieved racial neutrality in the life-death decision.
This is accomplished through statistical analysis assessing the presence or lack of racial
invariance in capital jury application of the North Carolina capital sentencing statute from
1990 to 2002. The secondary goal of the paper is to explore the viability of statistical
analyses as proof of nonpurposeful racial discrimination, which is potentially actionable
as violative of constitutional principles requiring evenhanded punishment, jury
impartiality and substantive due process.
To frame the empirical issues, it is necessary first to understand three pivotal
United States Supreme Court decisions: 1) Furman v. Georgia, 1972 (prohibited
standardless death sentencing; commuted all pending sentences to life and placed
moratorium on further death sentencing); 2) the combined holdings in Gregg v. Georgia
(1976), Proffitt v. Florida (1976) and Jurek v. Texas(1976) (established the two-pronged
1

‘guided discretion’ paradigm for death sentencing); and McCleskey v. Kemp (1987)
(rejected statistical showing of group-based racial disparity as evidence of purposeful
discrimination against an individual defendant; established undefined ‘constitutional
significance’ standard for statistical showing of Eighth Amendment arbitrariness in
operation of Furman-compliant sentencing procedures).
Furman v. Georgia (1972): The Eighth Amendment Argument
Ground zero for current capital punishment jurisprudence is the landmark case of
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman the Supreme Court rejected the
unlimited discretion previously afforded capital juries in making the life-death decision
as violative of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive, cruel and unusual
punishment. This approach to the life-death sentencing choice was based on a new
interpretation of what may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. Only a year before Furman, in McGautha v. California (1971) and its
consolidated companion case, Crampton v. Ohio (1971), the Court had rejected Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of procedural due process arguments against capital
sentencing procedures which employed a single jury for guilt and sentencing and allowed
standardless jury discretion under the California and Ohio capital sentencing statutes,
finding the procedures adequate and fair within the meaning of those two constitutional
provisions and that the exercise of discretion is essential to the sentencing process.
In Furman, the Court was presented with the different question of the
constitutionality of standardless death sentencing discretion under the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of excessive, cruel or unusual punishment, regardless of the
procedural fairness surrounding the decision. This time a majority of the Court found
2

that, although unbridled jury discretion may be exercised in a way which meets
procedural due process requirements, the lack of meaningful standards for deciding when
a death sentence is appropriate amounts to unacceptable arbitrariness under the Eighth
Amendment. The lack of standards capable of producing consistent and predictable
outcomes for the same crime was found to be excessive, cruel, and unusual punishment,
“freakishly imposed,” in the words of Justice Stewart (Furman, Stewart, J. concurring).
Among the reasons cited by the concurring plurality, and the dissenters as well,
for distinguishing death sentencing was the acknowledgement that ‘death is different’ in
its irrevocable finality; and although ‘traditional’ in our system, death is unique as the
ultimate penalty and requires maximum care to ensure equitable and correct decisions
(Furman, 1972). The potential for racial discrimination in death sentencing was not an
express basis for the Furman holding, but was specifically cited as one of the risks, if not
certain result of absolute jury sentencing discretion by Justices Douglas, Brennan,
Marshall, and acknowledged by dissenting Justices Burger and Powell. Unlike other
potentially legal and illegal bases for discriminatory governmental action, protection
from racial discrimination finds its roots in our history and the Constitution itself; the
Amendments were all enacted to end slavery and cure its ills by afford Black persons full
citizenship and equal protection of our laws. If ‘death is different’, so is race, and where
racial disparity is demonstrated in operation of the law, it demands scrutiny by the courts
for constitutional acceptability.
It should also be noted that the dissenters did not express a belief that the death
penalty as then administered was fair or color-blind, but stressed reluctance under
principles of judicial restraint to interfere with what was seen as a state legislative
3

function, or to expand so broadly the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. In a
foreshadowing of the controversy as to what constitutes proof of racial inequity in capital
sentencing to be addressed fifteen years later in McCleskey, Justices Burger and Powell
also questioned the degree to which the Court should rely on the statistical evidence cited
by members of the plurality in support of their positions (Furman, 1972, BURGER, J.
dissenting, at note 12; POWELL, J. dissenting).
Then there was the question of remedy. Among the concurring plurality, only
Justices Brennan and Marshall pressed for absolute rejection of death as a penalty, a
position both maintained until their deaths. Justices Douglas, White and Stewart opted
for rejection of the death penalty under then extant state statutes but did not rule out the
possibility that a statute could be drawn which would limit jury sentencing discretion to
impose death in constitutionally acceptable ways while preserving the jury’s ability to
grant leniency in specific cases (Furman, 1972). The result of Furman, then, was
invalidation of existing state capital sentencing statutes, a moratorium on further
imposition of the death penalty under such statutes, and commutation of all pending death
sentences to life in prison (Furman, 1972). Many believed, or at least hoped, that
Furman effectively abolished death as a penalty in this country; but that turned out not to
be the case (Radelet, 2001).
Furman Implemented: Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek
The state legislative response to Furman was immediate. Within four years,
thirty-five (35) states had re-enacted capital sentencing statutes intended to incorporate
the Furman principles, and five cases had made their way to the Supreme Court: Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
4

428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); and Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
Three of the states, Georgia, Florida and Texas, whose capital sentencing systems
were brought before the Court in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek, adopted procedures whereby
the capital sentencing discretion was appropriately guided in a ‘guided discretion’ model
as impliedly acceptable under Furman. . The Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek holdings collectively
represent the second stage – implementation – of the new death sentencing approach
announced in Furman. Each state statute provided two substantive, interacting criteria to
be used by the sentencing entity to decide when the death penalty would be appropriate:
1) standards defining and narrowing the class of crimes for which death could be
considered -- the aggravating criteria; and 2) mandatory procedures allowing
comprehensive consideration of individual mitigating factors which might justify mercy
in a particular defendant’s case (Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek).
Each state also provided an acceptable procedural framework for the application
of these standards, in the form of bifurcated guilt-penalty proceedings, automatic and
expedited appeal of all death sentences to the respective state supreme courts, and
mandatory proportionality review. 1 Although different in certain procedural respects, the
three statutory schemes approved in Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek have provided the template for
all state capital sentencing procedures today (Bowers & Foglia, 2003; Holowinski, 2002).

1

This last procedure was made optional some ten years later in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37
(1983), based on the Court’s conclusion that efficient aggravation standards made proportionality review
redundant. Some states, notably New Jersey and Florida, have retained proportionality review as an extra
procedural safeguard.
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The two remaining states, North Carolina and Louisiana, whose statutes were
reviewed in Woodson and Roberts, had also enacted procedures which significantly
limited and clearly defined the crimes for which death was an available penalty, but made
death mandatory for those few crimes, without allowing consideration of mitigatory
factors. The Court emphatically rejected this approach as inconsistent with Furman,
holding that while the jury’s discretion to impose death must be limited, its discretion to
grant life to individual defendants based on their unique situation could not (Woodson,
1976). The Furman approach thus dictates the narrowest of discretion to impose death,
while at the same time affords the broadest discretion to grant life. It is in the application
of these principles that nonpurposeful racial bias may have the most play – when capital
sentencing entities decide objectively whether a defendant’s crime deserves death, but
subjectively whether the defendant himself deserves life.
Fifteen years after Furman and a decade after its new take on the Eighth
Amendment notion of punishment was implemented per Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek, the
Supreme Court was presented squarely with the question of whether Furman and its
progeny had produced a sentencing procedure which was producing equitable death
sentencing – not just among capital defendants generally but between Black and White
defendants, in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
Race Neutrality Under Furman: McCleskey v. Kemp (1987)
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) is the third of the triumvirate of holdings which have
shaped capital sentencing law for the thirty-odd years since Furman, and it continues to
be the decision most affecting efforts to redress documented racial bias in the capital
justice system. Defendant McCleskey was an African-American convicted of the murder
6

of a White police officer and sentenced to death in Georgia. He brought a habeas corpus
proceeding seeking the overturn of his death sentence based on an assertion, that, despite
meeting the Furman standards per Gregg, distortions in the application of the Georgia
statute to Black citizens, reflected a racial bias infecting the Georgia capital justice
system which 1) violated his rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and 2) resulted in sentencing arbitrariness as to him which violated the Eighth
Amendment under Furman. No direct evidence of bias against McCleskey personally
was claimed or shown.
Denial of McCleskey’s equal protection claim.
In asserting that his death sentence was a denial of equal protection, McCleskey
relied on a theory of disparate impact between Black and White defendants and victims
from application of Georgia’s capital justice procedures, which was supported by a
comprehensive statistical study of the Georgia system (the Georgia Study) by Professor
David Baldus and his colleagues (Baldus, Woodworth & Pulaski, 1990). The study used
modern logistic regression methodologies like those previously accepted by the Court to
prove implied purposeful discrimination based on disparate impact in other nonsentencing situations, such as Title VII employment and housing discrimination cases and
jury venire selection (McCleskey, 1987).
McCleskey asserted that the Georgia Study established both an increased risk of a
death sentence for Black defendants over White defendants who had committed
comparable crimes, and for those who killed White victims, indicating an overall
devaluation of Black citizens. The study, he argued, showed that the statute as applied
placed Black capital defendants such as McCleskey at an unfair and arbitrary, higher risk
7

of receiving a death penalty than White defendants committing comparable crimes which
denied him equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and subjected him to
punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment. The real issue was what level and type
of proof would sustain a denial of equal protection claim based on disparate impact, or an
Eighth Amendment arbitrariness claim in a capital sentencing case: “This case presents
the question whether a complex statistical study that indicates a risk that racial
considerations enter into capital sentencing determinations proves that petitioner
McCleskey’s capital sentence is unconstitutional under the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendment.” (McCleskey, 1987).
It must be stressed that McCleskey was not challenging the Georgia statute
directly; his claim sought to overturn his individual sentence. While the overturn of his
sentence on a disparate impact basis may have set precedent applicable to other members
of the affected group – Black defendants sentenced to death – the relief he sought was
specific to him and this distinction between individual and general remedies is important
to understanding the holding in McCleskey (Graines, 2000).
There is an intent element in an equal protection claim which requires proof of
purposeful discrimination against an individual or a group to trigger the strictest judicial
scrutiny racial classification requires (Washington v. Davis (1976)). The purpose to
discriminate may be either express – disparate treatment – or inferred from informed
tolerance of differences in the impact of facially neutral governmental action on a group.
The inference requires a disparity in effect so significant as to imply an intent of adverse
effect on the group and its individual members – that is, disparate impact discrimination
is actionable only where it is so significant as to support an inference that “… the
8

decisionmaker selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action ‘because of,’ not
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon the identifiable group.” (Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 1979). Unconscious, but palpable,
discrimination is not actionable as a denial of equal protection (McCleskey, 1987;
Lawrence (1987)).
The McCleskey court denied his equal protection claim, holding that the broad
discretion inherent in capital sentencing and the myriad of factors which inform that
discretion in a jury capital sentencing decision in an individual case prevents use of
statistical proof of general racial disparities as sole proof of actionable purposeful racial
discrimination, within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, in imposing the death
sentence in an individual case.
The Court relied on it prior decisions holding that statistical or other evidence of
disproportionate negative impact of governmental action on one group over another is not
enough, standing alone, to support a finding of discriminatory intent (Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. (1977)) except where the pattern of disparity is
“stark”, citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960) [redistricting to exclude 395 of 400 Black
voters – a 99% disparity] and Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) [requiring permits for 310
laundries in wooden houses, but declining to issue permits for any of the 200 Chineseowned laundries – 100% disparity].
In rejecting the use of the proffered statistical proof in McCleskey’s case, the
Court also noted flexibility in its willingness to consider statistical proof of
discriminatory intent in Title VII cases and particularly distinguished its acceptance of
statistical proof in jury venire cases (Castaneda v. Partida (1977)[2-1 disparity between
9

Hispanic population and grand jury composition]; Whitus v. Georgia (1967)[3-1 disparity
between Black population and grand jury composition]; (Turner v. Fouche (1970)[1.6
disparity between Black population and grand jury composition], but based this
distinction on the level of discretion and number of decisionmakers involved in the
allegedly discriminatory action.
The Court held that the more decisionmakers, the more factors affecting the
decision, and the larger the number of decisions affecting the group from which the
plaintiff seeks to infer discrimination in his individual case, the further his claimed harm
is causally from the challenged action and the less acceptable statistics become as sole
proof of intent to discriminate (McCleskey, 1987). The Court held that “an application of
an inference drawn from general statistics to a specific decision in a trial and sentencing
[context] simply is not comparable to the application of an inference drawn from …”
these other contexts where the discretion was more defined and exercised by fewer
people (McCleskey, 1987).
The McCleskey Court acknowledged the potential for racial bias skewing capital
trial and sentencing decisions, but saw it as the inevitable consequence of the jury system
and the broad discretion it requires. The Court noted the framework of procedural
safeguards it had constructed by then to keep racial bias below as yet undefined
‘constitutionally acceptable’ levels at other discretionary decision points in the process
(Batson v. Kentucky (1986)[systematic prosecutorial strikes of Black jurors, or
demonstration of venire disproportionate to minority population is prima facie proof of
discriminatory intent for equal protection purposes, shifting burden to prosecutor to
provide race-neutral explanation for exclusion]; Irvin v. Dowd (1961)[widespread racial
10

bias can require change in venue]; Ristaino v. Ross (1976)[significant likelihood of racial
biasing influence requires questioning of jurors about racial attitudes]; Turner v. Murray
(1986) [high potential for racism biasing jurors in Black-on-White murder requires voir
dire re racial opinions under Sixth Amendment jury impartiality guarantee] and that effort
to perfect procedural fairness continues today (Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003))
[prosecutorial intent to discriminate racially in jury selection within meaning of Equal
Protection Clause in jury selection may be inferred from practices such as venire
‘shuffling’ and disparate questioning of White and Black jury candidates].
It is reasonable to conclude that McCleskey absolutely forecloses the use of
statistical evidence of group disparities as sole, competent proof of purposeful denial of
equal protection in individual capital sentences; at a minimum it expressly held that
something more than the ‘mere correlation’ between race and death sentencing the Court
found the Georgia Study produced is necessary (McCleskey, 1987). No case has
attempted to rely on an equal protection argument proffering solely statistical proof in a
sentencing context post-McCleskey (Pillai, 2001), and it is questionable whether such a
claim could be sustained as to any criminal sentence (Kennedy, 1988). Perhaps
McCleskey would allow an equal protection claim in a sentencing case, were the
statistically demonstrated disparity were sufficiently stark, or a different individual or
class-based remedy for denial of equal protection pursued which would allow use of
statistical to show racial discrimination in capital sentencing (Graines, 2000). In light of
the empirical studies to date, such a stark disparity is unlikely to be found, and continued
focus on equal protection theories begs the question of whether the cause of the disparity
is actually the result of purposeful discrimination – a required element of an equal
11

protection claim – or may be caused by nonpurposeful racial bias perhaps violative of
other constitutional provisions, such as the Eighth Amendment, also addressed in
McCleskey.
McCleskey’s Eighth Amendment claim.
Having rejected McCleskey’s equal protection claim as unproven, the Court next
looked at the sufficiency of the Georgia Study to demonstrate arbitrariness in
McCleskey’s sentencing result, violative of the Eighth Amendment under Furman. The
Court accepted the Georgia Study as valid for purposes of the Eighth Amendment claim
as it had for the equal protection claim, but where it may rejected the Georgia Study more
as being incompetent to sustain an inference of discriminatory intent in a sentencing
context, it rejected it in the Eighth Amendment context as being insufficient to document
a racial bias strong enough to rise beyond constitutionally acceptable levels, holding the
disparity demonstrated in the study lacked the ‘constitutional significance’ to be arbitrary
or capricious within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
The Court noted that McCleskey could not say his death sentence was
disproportional to his crime, as it involved aggravating circumstances the Georgia statute
had defined in sufficiently precise terms to qualify it for the death penalty. Nor could he
say that the Georgia statute was defective in allowing the jury broad discretion to
considering mitigatory factors when deciding life or death in his or any other case, since
it had been upheld already in Gregg, no racial bias had been asserted in its application to
him personally, and Woodson required jury discretion in sentencing. The only possible
basis for an Eighth Amendment claim was showing constitutionally significant disparity
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– and this is the puzzle the McCleskey decision poses: What level of racial prejudice
must be shown to trigger constitutional significance?
Without explaining what level it might have found constitutionally unacceptable,
the McCleskey court took more of a ‘we’ll-know-it-when-we-see-it’ approach, and did
not see it in McCleskey’s case. The Court noted that the jury is the criminal defendant’s
“fundamental ‘protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice (McCleskey
(1987), citing Strauder v. West Virginia (1880)) and that the purpose of requiring that the
composition of a capital sentencing jury reflect the criminal’s community is to assure
‘diffused impartiality (citing Taylor v. Louisiana (1975)). The Court acknowledged
again that individual jurors bring to the sentencing decision their personal attitudes,
experience and other qualities which cannot be reduced to range of factors to which
legislation can apply. Still, the Court rejected any argument that the broad discretion to
be lenient is per se constitutionally unacceptable, and confirmed that the broad discretion
for mercy is absolutely essential to the capital sentencing decision provided it is exercised
in the facially fairest possible setting.
Having accepted that McCleskey’s sentence was proportional and the result of
scrupulously fair procedures for the exercise of the sentencing discretion, but agreeing
that racial prejudice is always a risk in sentencing situation, the Court examined the
Georgia Study to determine “exactly” what it showed and whether it rose to the level of
constitutional significance requiring further inquiry. The Court relied heavily on the trial
court’s analysis of the study, which had resulted in a rejection of the findings as flawed
by problems with the methodology, such as sample size and selection, coding problems,
variable selection and missing data: “’It is a major premise of a statistical case that the
13

data mirrors reality. If it does not in substantial degree mirror reality, any inferences
empirically arrived at are untrustworthy’” (McCleskey, at footnotes 5-7). The Supreme
Court elected to accept the study as valid, as had the appellate court, but held that the
results did not rise to constitutional significance within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.
The Court focused on two points: 1) logistic regression analysis quantifies only
the degree to which the risk of the outcome occurring is increased or decreased by the
factor analyzed and the study failed to produce statistically significant racial disparities in
the risks of a death sentence; and 2) the instability and lack of predictive efficiency in the
models used, as evidenced by low R2 values, weaken the validity of any inference of
constitutionally unacceptable race-based sentencing disparities.
The unadjusted data showed a notable race-of-victim effect (11% of White victim
cases resulting in a death sentence versus 1% of Black victim cases) and a slight, reversed
race-of-defendant effect (4% Black defendants versus 7% White defendants with death
sentence). When the data was subjected to logistic regression analysis, the only racial
effect demonstrated was a significant increase [a multiplier of 4.3] in the risk of any
defendant receiving the death penalty if his victim was White, but a Black defendant was
almost as likely to receive a death sentence as a White defendant, his risk being only 1.1
times higher. The highest fit was for a 230-variable model which attempted to
incorporate all possible influences on a capital sentencing decision, with an R2 of
“between .46 and .48”, meaning it predicted the sentencing outcome in less than 50% of
the cases (McCleskey at footnote 6).

14

Thus it can be concluded that 4.3 multiplier of the risk of death sentencing, at
least based on the race of a victim, was not significant enough in the eyes of the
McClesky court to be constitutionally significant for Eighth Amendment purposes. It can
also be concluded that logistic regression models with a predictive value of less than 50%
are not sufficiently predictive to relay on their results for a finding of constitutionally
unacceptable levels of race bias in a capital sentencing context. What higher disparities
and predictive efficiencies might trigger the Eighth Amendment or the Sixth Amendment
protections against ‘constitutionally significant’ racial bias are unknown, but the levels
shown in McCleskey were not enough.
No case has since reached the Court relying solely on statistical evidence for a
challenge to the death penalty. Unfortunately, despite three decades of fine-tuning these
models and the construction of a complex system of ‘super due process’ safeguards
around them, the empirical research still finds significant unexplained disparities between
Black and White citizens in the administration of capital justice. (Baldus & Woodworth,
2004; Bowers & Foglia, 2003; Howe, 2004). What remains in dispute is whether this
research is sufficient to raise constitutional red flags as to the continued legality of the
death penalty. It is also likely that any significant disparity found is not intentional, but
the result of unconscious racial attitudes, in light of the continued integration of society.
Latent Racism versus Blatant Racism
Open racism is no longer politically correct, and it can fairly be said that Furman
and its progeny have largely eliminated purposeful racism from death sentencing (Howe,
2004), although it may still exist in certain, defined geographic areas (Baldus &
Woodworth, 2003; Paternoster & Brame, 2003). Many argue that latent racism still
15

infects capital justice, not in the form of open prejudice, but as the cultural relic of three
centuries of slavery and Jim Crow (Howe, 2004; Lawrence, 1987). The McCleskey court
acknowledged that race-based sentencing disparities exist, citing various studies and
noting Congress’ development of sentencing guidelines for criminal cases to reduce
unguided discretion arising out of individual predispositions not just in capital cases but
in all criminal cases (McCleskey at footnotes 35, 38), while at the same time accepting
some level of racism as an unavoidable by-product of the jury system.
As we have moved further from the 1970’s, and the civil rights movement has
cooled from confrontation to implementation of the laws intended to cure racial
discrimination, the nature of racism has changed. Critical race theorists maintain that
although open racism has dwindled, latent racism is still a pernicious and pervasive
negative force in society (Lynch & Patterson, 1996). The source of latent racism is a
topic for theoretical debate with the so-called ‘idealists’, who have most affected the legal
system in this country, viewing racism as attitudinal – and thus capable of change over
time as the law forces social change and acceptance of disparate groups (Lawrence,
1987). The ‘realists’ among post-modern theorists view racism as the product of the
continuing struggle between the classes in a capitalist society, with those in power always
consciously and unconsciously acting to maintain their status and suppress those below
by keeping them in their place (Delgado, 2001). Both sides agree that racism, both latent
and blatant, is still an active force in our culture.
Intentional racism is relatively easy to eliminate because it is the result of
conscious personal choices and thus can be addressed through education and the threat of
legal consequences. Latent racism is unintentional and nonpurposeful; it just happens as
16

part of the social, cultural, geographical, religious and even political conditioning which
occurs in development of individual personalities and attitudes (Lawrence, 1988;
Lenhardt, 2004). It thus is not subject to traditional legal remedies applicable to
intentional, purposeful conduct, such as equal protection claims, and can only be cured by
time and proximity to the object of the unconscious negative attitudes.
To fear those of a different race and thus different from one’s self is human,
apparently a learned survival reaction which can be unlearned through proximity (Öhme,
2005). The unconscious attribution of negative traits to Black persons may occur among
White capital jurors who still make up the majority of juries, despite even the most
conscientious effort at intellectual racial neutrality because the trial and sentencing
experience is filtered through each individual jurors viewpoint, life experience and
attitudes, including racial attitudes of both Black and White jurors (King, 1993;
Eisenberg, Garvey & Wells, 2001).
Other factors which affect jury decision making are internal to the process itself, a
process in which many capital jurors misunderstand their role so that their decision may
be premature, arise out of incomprehension of the instructions given, or an erroneous
belief that a guilty decision requires the death penalty or that a life decision may result in
release of the defendant, and so on (Bowers & Foglia, 2002; Foglia, 2003). The effect of
these factors will also interact with racial attitudes, although none of these factors can be
attributed to a conscious desire to discriminate against a defendant based on his race. All
can be attributed to individual juror characteristics, including unconscious racial bias,
which cannot be standardized by additional due process but may still significantly
undermine the fairness of the sentencing process.
17

The difficulty lies in detecting and quantifying unconscious and thus
nonpurposeful racism in order to determine the degree to which it may affect capital
sentencing decisions under Furman. To date the issue of nonpurposeful discrimination
resulting in racially variance in capital sentencing has not been raised before the Supreme
Court. If such bias exists there are no directly applicable legal standards to cure it.
The primary empirical objective of this study was to detect and measure racial
variance in application of the Furman standards as embodied in a Furman-compliant
state capital sentencing law, in this case, that of North Carolina. Evidence that the
apparently neutral application of the Furman-based, legally relevant sentencing standards
– the aggravating and mitigating circumstances accepted by a capital jury – to similarly
situated defendants -- is not racially invariant casts doubt on the legality – and the
morality -- of continuing to use the Furman model to send defendants to their death more
because of their race than their crime. A finding of racial variance may indicate, as
Justice Blackmon concluded towards the end of his life 2 , that the Furman experiment has
failed, and that the Constitution demands a different approach to punishment of the most
serious crimes. It may also be indicative of latent nonpurposeful racism still skewing the
process which cannot be addressed by additional procedural fix-its. The results provide a
basis for alternative constitutional arguments under which the Supreme Court may be
willing to consider supporting statistical evidence in evaluating the racial disparity in

2

As one of his last acts on the Court, Justice Blackmun receded completely from his position in Furman
and voted to abolish the death penalty: “Rather than continue to coddle the Court’s delusion that the
desired level of fairness has been reached … I feel morally and intellectually obligated to concede that the
death penalty experiment has failed.” ( Callins v. Collins (1994), BLACKMUN, J. dissenting).
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capital sentencing procedures and find such disparities constitutionally unacceptable and
repugnant to fundamental concepts of racial equity.
This introductory chapter has outlined in the broadest terms the legal setting for
the discussion. Chapter Two presents a more detailed summary of the constitutional and
legal issues at play in death sentencing and the effect of the McCleskey decision on the
use of statistical analyses to prove racial disparities. Chapter Three provides an overview
of the extant empirical studies on the influence of race on capital justice in this country
and defines the research problem presented and the hypotheses tested. Chapter Four
describes the North Carolina data and the logistic regression methodology used. Chapter
Five presents the results of the logistic regression analyses performed. Finally, Chapter
Six discusses the results and draws conclusions as to the meaning and possible use of the
findings in the continuing effort to maximize race-blind decision-making in capital
sentencing.
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Chapter Two
Legal Overview
Chapter One explained the import of Furman, Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek and
McCleskey on the continued use of the death penalty in this country, despite the potential
for race-based disparity. It is important to note several things about these cases. First,
they are all capital sentencing cases and do not apply directly to the other discretionary
decisions which lead a defendant to the life-death decision and might be racially-biased.
Thus studies showing racial bias at the prosecutorial decisions may inform these
sentencing holdings, and vice-versa, but are not directly on point insofar as their legal
reasoning.
Secondly, although McCleskey held that only purposeful discrimination may be
redressed under equal protection principles and rejected the use of statistical proof to
imply intent, it did not require intent to discriminate in an Eighth Amendment context,
nor did Furman or Gregg. Rather the question posed – and left unanswered -- was what
level of racial disparity would be constitutionally significant. Thirdly, no case has yet
decided what level of statistically demonstrated race-based disparity in capital sentencing
would trigger constitutional protections under doctrines other than equal protection,
although McCleskey provided guidance as to what won’t.
The final major issue raised by these cases is the choice of remedy. For example,
McCleskey was a habeas corpus proceeding seeking to overturn a specific defendant’s
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sentence as a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, where Furman
and Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek sought to answer the broader legal question as to whether the
death penalty statutes then administered in Texas and Georgia – and echoed in other
capital states – resulted in cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
While all of these cases sought specific relief from death sentences, relief in McCleskey’s
case would have been specific to him – that his particular sentence was unconstitutional - and involved a very individual burden of proof of purposeful harm to him as an
individual notwithstanding the fact that his success would have effectively invalidated the
Georgia statute. Furman and Gregg were appeals of state supreme court decisions,
petitions for writ of certiorari seeking the answer to broad legal questions of general
applicability, and thus affected directly all death sentences reached prior to their holdings.
The choice of remedy affects the burden of proof and the weight accorded the
statistical evidence. A habeas proceeding is an original proceeding, and the Court is not
limited to the record and legal questions as in certiorari proceedings, but the burden of
proof is heavier. McCleskey applied habeas corpus evidentiary standards [‘exceptional’,’
clear and convincing’ proof] to an individual equal protection and Eighth Amendment
claim seeking individual relief. Because of the uncertainty in any statistical analysis and
the fact this McCleskey’s claim was supported only by statistical proof implying the
necessary discriminatory purpose and arbitrariness, he simply did not meet his burden of
showing purposeful discrimination. Had he raised claims in a proceeding with a lesser
evidentiary requirement, or which did not have an intent element, or had the statistics
been stronger, he may have fared better and certainly would have a lower bar to jump.
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Racial disparity, be it intentional or not, which skews so irrevocable a decision as
the life-death decision in a capital case, raises a Constitutional alarm to which the court
must at some point respond. Since the only way to prove systemic bias is through
statistical studies – which are by definition only estimates, not absolute fact -- McCleskey
seems to have eliminated equal protection as a basis for challenging racially disparate
capital sentencing by requiring a showing of racially discriminatory intent. Whether any
statistically proven level of substantive latent racism in the capital justice system is or is
not acceptable under our Constitution is beyond the scope of this analysis, except to
frame the issues and suggest possible alternative legal vehicles to resolve them in the
courts – but there are arguments to be made.
Alternative Constitutional Principles
There are four constitutional provisions pertinent to the issue of significant racial
disparity in application of the death penalty. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
guarantee substantive and procedural due process of law before any governmental
deprivation of life, liberty, or property. It has been argued that substantive due process
requires racial equity in capital sentencing (Bird, 2003) and it would seem fundamental
that the Constitution would abhor – as a matter of substance over form -- a demonstrably
racially inequitable result of application of a law, regardless of how procedurally perfect
it may be.
As to Sixth and Eighth Amendment concerns, the Court has already indicated that
some level of racial disparity in capital sentencing outcomes is unavoidable, but at an as
yet undefined point such disparity may reach levels unacceptable under Sixth
Amendment guarantees of trial and sentencing impartiality or amount to arbitrary and
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capricious action violative of the Eighth Amendment. The Court has already expressly
acknowledged that Black-on-White crime poses the greatest risk for play of racial
prejudice (Turner (1986); McCleskey (1987)). Statistical analysis is the only means to
measure racial disparity – inter- or intra-racial -- when looking at the overall, long term
operation of a statute As discussed in Chapter One, there is no guideline beyond the
Court’s consideration of the Eighth Amendment argument in McCleskey as to what level
of disparity would be unacceptable other than it should reach statistical significance and
be the product of a better-than-50% predictive model which incorporates appropriate
variables to allow reasonable comparison of similar levels of criminal culpability among
the defendants. Once a statistically significant disparity is demonstrated, these two
constitutional protections are arguably triggered and thus may provide a basis to
challenge the race-neutrality of a statute. What the Court would make of such a disparity,
or what degree of disparity might offend constitutional sensibilities is unknown. As to
the possibility of a substantive due process claim, several legal and proof obstacles would
have to be surmounted, but such a claim may also be viable.
Race-based Sentencing Disparity as Denial of Substantive Due Process
Legal scholars have argued that substantive due process principles might sustain
for a challenge to the death penalty because of the higher, strict scrutiny the Court must
afford to claimed deprivations of ‘fundamental’ rights (Bedau, 1996; Bird, 2003) and the
heavier burden placed on the state to show a compelling interest which cannot be
protected through other means other than the discriminatory action which also must be
shown to be tailored as narrowly as possible to do so. Once the claimant demonstrates
the existence of the ‘fundamental right’ – a legal question -- and the fact that it is being in
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some way infringed upon by the state action in question – a mixed question of law and
fact -- the primary burden of proof and persuasion shifts to the state. The viability of a
substantive due process claim based on racial disparity has yet to be explored by the
Court in a death penalty case, primarily because other constitutional protections have
been available to redress racial discrimination in the past. If, however, none of the other
constitutional provisions are adequate to support a claim, because of proof or procedural
issues peculiar to a capital sentencing situation, a substantive due process claim might
suffice.
Substantive due process is a judicially created doctrine which holds that in
addition to the rights specifically enumerated in the Constitution, certain rights are so
fundamental to life and liberty that they are inherently protected by the Constitution
despite the lack of guidance from the more specific provisions of the Constitution
(Crump, 1996). No ‘fundamental’ right to life has yet been fully recognized by the Court
(Bird, 2003). Most of the cases touching on this issue have been based in fundamental
liberty interests, such as the right to privacy (Griswold v. Connecticut (1967)
[establishing a woman’s privacy right to birth control]; Roe v. Wade (1973) [woman’s
privacy right to chose whether to be pregnant or not]; Washington v. Glucksburg
(1997)[no privacy right to die, even for terminally ill patients Other liberty interests
recognized by the court are freedom of unwarranted governmental infringement of
personal movement (County of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998)) and travel (Kent v.
Dulles(1958)), and bodily integrity (Rochin v. California (1952)). The right to life has
been discussed in the context of excessive force cases which resulted in death, from a
police chase, and the Court has said it requires “something more than negligence and less
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than intent to harm (County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 1998). There is also a murky
question of what, if any, substantive due process rights exist in constitutionally fair
procedures. In Albright v. Olivier, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), the Court held that there was no
substantive due process liberty interest in the prosecutorial charging decision being based
on probable cause in a case where a defendant was arrested and charged, but later
released by the court upon a finding of no probable cause for either. A distinguishing
factor, however, was that there had not been a “palpable” consequence to the defendant,
who had turned himself in voluntarily (Albright, 1998). Here the harm is palpable, finite
and irreparable.
Although there is a certain optimism reflected in the legal literature about the
viability of a fundamental ‘right to life’ in a challenge to the death penalty (Bird, 2003), it
seems unrealistic in today’s political climate, and may be unnecessary. An alternative
and perhaps more politically palatable argument could be made that there is a
fundamental liberty interest in a non-arbitrary, racially neutral capital sentencing, which
is not protected by application of the Furman standards – that is, that liberty within the
meaning of our law requires racial neutrality – or at least statistically significant equity -in punishment. What is the point of perfect procedural due process if the results are still
markedly unfair, regardless of the lack of purposeful discrimination because the bias is
culturally based, not consciously applied? This would seem especially important when
dealing with a protected classification such as race and a permanent and irrevocable loss
of liberty and body.
There is also a level of proof issue: the Supreme Court has held that the
governmental action asserted to violate due process must be “egregious” or “shock the
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conscience” (County of Sacramento, 1997; Rochin, 1952). Would continued execution of
citizens in the face of documented and statistically significant racial disparity in the
imposition of the death penalty shock the conscience? The level of proof in a substantive
due process claim would possibly have to be as ‘stark’ as the McCleskey court implied
for Eighth Amendment arbitrariness – and if so, could be resolved under that provision.
Another obstacle to pursuit of a substantive due process analysis is that the Court will not
consider it if any other protection specifically afforded under the Constitution also applies
(Graham v. Connor (1989)). Substantive due process violations can be pled, but will not
be addressed by the Court if any other constitutional principle is directly raised and
applies. To the extent, then, that the Sixth or Eighth Amendment arguments are raised
and found to apply – regardless of whether the Court finds the action in question violates
them – the substantive due process argument may never be reached. The Graham court
suggested, although it has not yet been conclusively held, that all post-conviction
complaints about the death penalty as ‘excessive’ or ‘unjustified’ must be brought under
the Eighth Amendment. Since it is unknown whether either the Sixth or the Eighth
Amendments can support a challenge to racial inequity in death sentencing caused by
nonpurposeful racial bias proven with statistical studies, it is also unknown whether a
substantive due process argument is available at all, but Graham seems to make it the
argument of last resort.
Remedies
Finally, even where a constitutional violation can be shown, the choice of remedy
will affect how the Supreme Court will interpret the Constitution in particular cases, as
the McCleskey case shows. This is particularly important when the only basis for the
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claim of a constitutional violation is a statistical analysis producing general results as to a
group which is being asserted as evidence of harm to an individual. That is one reason
why remedies such as habeas corpus and other appellate remedies seeking individual
relief from a death sentence may not be the best vehicle to challenge an individual death
sentence, as McCleskey demonstrated (Graines, 2000; Vetter, 2004).
Habeas corpus [literally ‘let you have the body’] is an attack by a person in
custody on the legality of his confinement, and is the appropriate remedy where a
prisoner is attacking the fact or duration of his custody (Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973)).
Habeas is a procedure particularly unsuited for a challenge to a death sentence based on
statistical evidence of a pattern of racial disparity in sentencing decisions. The level of
proof is high requiring “exceptionally clear” proof of an abuse of the sentencing
discretion, and may not be too ‘speculative’ (Bracy v. Gramley, (1997)). Discovery
rights are limited and individual state and federal post-conviction remedies must first be
exhausted (Graines, 2000).
It has been suggested that Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 (2004)
[“Section 1983”], which affords a remedy for constitutional injuries arising under state
statutes (‘color of state law’), might prove a better vehicle to present race-based
discrimination claims as to death sentencing and that a class action might be more
appropriate where statistical analyses are the only proof of such disparity (Graines, 2000).
A Section 1983 action is a civil action – a kind of constitutional tort action -- brought in
federal or state court, and is thus subject to the more relaxed procedural and evidentiary
standards afforded in civil cases which particularly lend credence and weight to valid
statistical evidence of the type found wanting in McCleskey (Graines, 2000). It also
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offers systemic relief in the form of injunction, declarations as to the constitutionality of
the state action or law, recovery of attorney’s fees on success, and possibly money
damages.
Unlike habeas or an individual appeal, Section 1983 claims may be brought either
individually or on behalf of a class of similarly harmed claimants – for example, all death
row defendants sentenced under a sentencing statute asserted to be unconstitutional. No
one has tried a class action to raise racial discrimination in death sentencing and there are
limits as to the kind of claim a convicted prisoner may assert in a Section 1983 action
(Graines, 2000) and a question of when such a claim might ripen in the procedural path a
death sentence follows post-conviction. However, recently, in Nelson v. Campbell, 541
U.S. 637 (2004), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the viability of an individual death row
inmate using Section 1983 to challenge the method of his impending execution. In
Nelson the prisoner sought Section 1983 relief from the use of the painful open-cut
method used by Alabama for lethal injection, where the prisoner’s arm is slit open to
reveal a vein, insuring proper insertion of the needle.
Nelson sought injunctive relief against the use of that procedure in his execution,
and preliminary injunctive relief from execution by lethal injection so long as that
procedure was used by Alabama, claiming it was cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment. A deciding factor in the Supreme Court’s approving the use of a Section
1983 action in this case was the defendant’s prior unsuccessful completion of the habeas
corpus process and other state remedies. Section 1983 thus may not be available to an
individual before he has sought habeas corpus relief and any state remedies, including
administrative relief, and has failed, unless he can show that such remedies would have
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no chance of success (Nelson, 2005). This may apply to class actions as well – the
members of the class may be limited to those death row inmates who have exhausted
other remedies.
Section 1983 cannot be used to challenge a death sentence directly (Nelson,
2005). A key factor noted by the Nelson court for the allowing a Section 1983 claim in a
death sentence context was the fact he was not attacking his conviction or sentence, only
the method of execution. Thus the claim could not assert that the defendant or class was
innocent, or that the death penalty was not proportional to or even appropriate for the
crime. A claimant, or claimants, would have to concede guilt and the death-worthiness
of their crime, and attack not their sentence but the statute and how it was applied,
seeking not a reversal but alternative relief from application of the statute challenge in the
form of life sentence – without parole -- instead of death, as a punishment
It is unlikely that the current Court would totally abolish the death penalty, even
should it find the Furman approach to be lacking. An action raising questions of racial
bias skewing application of the Furman standards and thus the imposition of the death
sentence would more likely be successful seeking preliminary injunctive relief from
executions until factual questions as to the existence and degree of racial disparity
produced by application of a state’s death sentencing statute was settled. Should the
claimant demonstrate constitutionally unacceptable levels of racial disparity in who has
received the death penalty and who has not, all that should be sought or granted is
invalidation of the state statute in question, commutation of all death sentences it
produced to life-without-parole, and at a minimum a moratorium on further death
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sentencing in the state until a way is found to prevent constitutionally significant
disparity – i.e., the Furman remedy.
Alternatively, a preliminary injunction could seek a nationwide comprehensive
exploration of the issue of racism to determine if latent bias can be sufficiently reduced or
eliminated in capital sentencing under Furman, and request a moratorium on further
sentencing or executions pending the outcome. A litigant would have to be prepared not
only to present strong evidence to support any preliminary relief, but also a plan to
complete such a study in a defined and not overly long time frame. The focus would not
be the Furman standards themselves, but the question of whether any legal standard is
sufficient, at this point in time, to remove significant but unconscious racial bias from the
capital sentencing decision.
The details pro and con for this remedy are beyond the scope of this discussion,
but such an action could provide a forum for full study of the efficacy of the Furman,
unhindered by the more stringent, narrow evidentiary and procedural constraints on
individual appeals or remedies such as habeas corpus. The research presented here
provides a good starting point because the North Carolina statute is an excellent
embodiment of the Furman principles, and there is a thorough and reliable database
available for capital penalty proceedings post-Furman.
Section 15A-2000, NC General Statutes
Under the North Carolina sentencing statute (Section 15A-2000, NC General
Statutes (2003)) capital juries have only two options, a death sentence or a sentence of
life in prison, currently one without the possibility of parole except by executive
clemency. North Carolina uses a bifurcated guilt-penalty procedure and is a weighing
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state. It is a three step process: the jury first determines whether based on the evidence
sufficient aggravators, limited to the eleven enumerated in the statute, exist –
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt – which are sufficiently substantial to justify
a death sentence. Once one or more aggravators have been found by the group, the jury
next decides individually but based on the evidence if there are mitigating circumstances
or circumstances applicable to the defendant. If so, each juror then decides if they are
sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found, and they
vote (Section 15A-2000(e), NC General Statutes (2003)). A single juror thus can hang a
jury – and ensure a life sentence -- by finding a single mitigator justifies – at least to him
or her – mercy for that defendant.
There are eight mitigators specified in the statute, which also has a ninth, catch-all
provision allowing jurors to consider any other circumstance arising from the evidence
which the jury deems to have mitigating value (Section 15A-2000, NC General Statutes
(2003)(f)). The final decision the jury must reach, unanimously, is whether, based on the
first two findings the defendant should be sentenced to death or to imprisonment in the
State's prison for life (Section 15A-2000, NC General Statutes (2003)). The statute also
requires, per Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek, automatic and immediate appeal of death sentences to
the North Carolina Supreme Court, which reviews for errors and also for proportionality
to other similar crimes and defendants (Section 15A-2000(d), NC General Statutes
(2003)). The North Carolina statute thus provides an excellent framework in which to
employ empirical analysis of the degree to which Furman has produced fair – and
racially equitable – death sentencing.
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Chapter Three
Empirical Research and Statement of the Problem

The intuitive question of whether there is racial disparity in the application of the
death penalty in America has been the subject of numerous scientific studies, of varying
degrees of sophistication and validity. The research can be best be understood organized
in three time frames: Studies of cases from the years pre-Furman, studies of cases after
Furman went into effect through 1990 when a comprehensive federal study of racial
disparity in capital sentencing was released (GAO Report, 1990), and the research since
1990.
Pre-Furman Research
Studies of capital sentencing in cases before Furman showed a significant bias
against Black defendants, particularly in the South. Guy Johnson’s 1941 study, The
Negro and Crime, looked at the comparative frequency of death penalty sentences
between Black and White defendants between 1940-1940, and found that 32% of Black
murder defendants received the death penalty, compared to only 13% of White
defendants. He also found a race-of-victim effect, with the death penalty being imposed
in 17.5% of White victim cases, but in only .4% of the Black victim cases (Johnson,
1941). Garfunkel (1949) found similarly disparate racial effects in his study of death
sentencing patterns in ten North Carolina counties for the years 1930-1941. In 1969,
however, a study of first-degree murder trials pre-Furman in California produced no
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evidence of either a race-of-defendant or race-of-victim effect (Stanford Study, 1969).
Wolfgang and Reidel’s 1973 study of racial patterns in death sentencing between 1945
and 1965 in several Southern states, including North Carolina, discerned patterns similar
to those found earlier by Johnson and Garfunkel, which were also consistent among the
other states examined (Wolfgang & Reidel, 1973). As noted earlier, by 1972, the
possibility of racial bias in sentencing practices resulting in unfair death sentences had
already been considered by the Supreme Court in McGautha/Crampton, in which the
process was upheld. In Furman, however, the Court decided that death, as the
punishment produced from the procedurally fair process was not substantively fair or
acceptable under the Eighth Amendment, and the law of death sentencing changed.
Post-Furman Studies to 1990
The thrust of the next stage in the empirical research was to see if the Furman
principles, as implemented in procedures established under Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek changed
the racial distribution of death sentencing. In 1981, five years after Furman-compliant
processes began to be implemented, Gary Kleck reviewed the published literature on
racial effects on capital sentencing, and reached the conclusion that there no general
racial bias was shown against Black defendants, except in Southern states; but that the
death penalty was imposed less when the victim was Black, than when the victim was
White (Kleck, 1981). Six years later, Nakell and Hardy published a study of the initial
post-Furman years, 1977-1978, and application of the Furman-based sentencing models.
Unlike earlier studies, they controlled for case seriousness and found a race-of-defendant
effect at the prosecutorial charging decision, but not at the sentencing stage – where a
race-of-victim effect was noted (Nakell & Hardy, 1987). In 1989, Gross and Mauro
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published a study of death sentencing patterns from 1976-1980, using FBI and law
enforcement data from eight states. Like Nakell and Hardy, they controlled broadly for
case characteristics and found a statistically significant increase in the likelihood of a
defendant receiving the death sentence when the victim was White, which remained
consistent, although reduced when race-of-defendant was added to the analysis (Gross &
Mauro, 1989).
The debate as to the existence of racial effects on capital sentencing outcomes
continued in the first two decades after Furman, to the point that in 1990, the United
States Senate authorized the General Accounting Office (GAO) to examine the issue.
Rather than conducting a time-consuming and expensive new analysis, the GAO elected
to perform an evaluative synthesis of the twenty-eight studies of post-Furman sentencing
patterns, six of which were also post-McCleskey (GAO, 1990).
Included were the studies of Gross and Mauro, Kleck, Nakell and Hardy, and
Wolfgang and Riedel (GAO,1990), as well as studies of death sentencing patterns
generally (Berk & Lowery, unpublished 1985; Bowers, 1983; Foley & Powell, 1982; Keil
& Vito, 1989; Klein, Abrahamse & Rolph, unpublished, 1989; Radelet & Pierce, 1985;
Radelet, 1981; Riedel, 1976) and studies state specific to Georgia (Baldus, Woodworth &
Pulaski, 1990; Barnett, 1985); Texas (Ekland-Olson, 1988); Louisiana (Klemm, 1986);
Smith, 1987); Florida (Arkin, 1980; Foley, 1987; Lewis, Mannie & Vetter, 1979; Radelet
& Vandiver, 1983; Zeisel, 1981), California (Klein, 1989), , South Carolina (Paternoster
& Kazyaka, 1988), Kentucky (Gennaro & Keil, 1988; Keil & Vito, 1990), New Jersey
(Benin et al., 1988), Illinois (Murphy, 1984), and Mississippi (Berk & Lowery,
unpublished 1985) (GAO, 1990).
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The GAO assessed and rated the studies for quality in terms of design, selection
of variables and statistical methodology (GAO, 1990). The evaluation was not limited to
sentencing, where Furman applies, but encompassed the entire capital justice process,
looking at the potential for racial bias at each discretionary decision point (GAO, 1990).
The GAO found a consistent race-of-victim effect, although it acknowledged that some
studies, such as the Kiel and Vito (1990) study found race-of-defendant effects, and that
Paternoster and Kazyaka (1988) found regional race-of-defendant effects (GAO, 1990).
As a result, the GAO concluded that while there was evidence to support a finding of a
main race-of-victim effect, any race-of-defendant effect was “equivocal” and varied
“across a number of dimensions” (GAO, 1990).
The South Carolina study by Paternoster and Kazyaka looked at South Carolina
prosecutorial charging decisions beginning in1977, when South Carolina’s Furman-based
statute went into effect (Paternoster and Kazyaka (1988) The study was important in that
it demonstrated an urban-rural effect at the prosecutorial level which had a racial
component – all defendants were at more risk of being charged with a crime in rural areas
than in urban areas, Black defendants were at most risk, and those Black defendants who
killed White victims were at the highest risk of all (Paternoster & Kazyaka, 1988). This
intrusion of racial bias at the charging stage, it was argued, had little possibility of being
corrected at the sentencing or appellate stages if the defendant was found guilty. One of
the shortcomings of the study for purposes of examining the effect of race on the
sentencing decision, however, was that neither defendant characteristics beyond race and
gender, nor case-seriousness factors were controlled for in the analysis. Since Furman
applies only at the sentencing stage, and requires consideration both of case seriousness
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as defined by the aggravators and defendant’s individual situation for purposes of
mitigation, this study is not as valuable for assessment of bias in the sentencing process
alone.
Gross and Mauro’s examination of racial disparities in capital sentencing is more
pertinent to the limited issue of whether Furman as implemented through
Gregg/Proffitt/Jurek produces color-blind results. They looked at homicide data from
eight states, most in the South: Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia, between 1976 and 1980. Like Paternoster and
Kazyaka, they were looking at urban-rural differences in treatment of Black and White
crime. Unlike the South Carolina study, however, Gross and Mauro attempted to control
for crime seriousness as well, incorporating variables felony homicide, stranger murder,
multiple victims, victim female gender, and the method of killing {shot versus
bludgeoning, strangling, stabbing), which they use to scale the cases roughly by
aggravation level. They also controlled for urban-rural, defendant and victim race, and
interactive effects of race (Gross & Mauro, 1989). Their study showed that the ruralurban effect was strongest in the Southern states, particularly Georgia and Florida; and a
similar geographic bias occurred for race-of-victim effects. As noted earlier, no main
race-of-defendant effect was shown except where the race of the victim was White.
In 1988, Bienan et al. examined all homicide cases committed in New Jersey from
August 1982 -- when New Jersey’s Furman-compliant sentencing statute went into effect
-- through the end of 1986, to assess which factors affected the sentencing outcome. The
study was not limited to the penalty stage – few penalty cases were used – and its main
focus was on the probability that a case progressed from the charging decision to capital
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trial (Bienen et al., 1988). Unlike the two earlier studies, this New Jersey study included
not only case characteristics related to aggravation and defendant and victim
characteristics such as gender, age and race (Black, White, Hispanic) but also socioeconomic factors such as income class, employment and relative physical disability. The
study produced what was characterized as ‘substantial differences’ based on racial
differences, across geographic jurisdictions, including a significant race-of-victim effect
(Bienen et al., 1988). Here again, however, the primary stage in the process examined
was the pre-sentencing stage, which may indicate a possibly pervasive racial bias in the
capital justice system as a whole, but cannot be used to assess the race neutrality of the
Furman sentencing process itself.
Post-1990 Studies
The post-1990 studies also generally document a race-of-victim effect on capital
sentencing and less so a race-of-defendant effect (Baldus & Woodworth, 2003). In a
1991 study, Klein and Rolph found race-of-victim disparity in California capital penalty
trials, with an unadjusted result showing a 9 percentage point race-of-victim disparity.
The authors acknowledge that the effect shown was limited to the penalty stage and did
not take into account earlier discretionary decision point where race could have an effect,
such as the prosecutorial charging decision (Klein & Rolph, 1991). The subsequent
CART analysis 3 , including multiple case characteristics, showed race-of-victim to be a
significant predictor of sentencing outcomes (Klein & Rolph, 1991).

3

Baldus and Woodworth have reservations about the use of the CART methodology (Baldus & Woodworth, 2003),
and the advantage of a CART analysis over a logistic regression analysis was the subject of a recent study by Berk, Li
and Hickman (2004) in which they re-analyzed the Maryland capital sentencing data used by Paternoster and Brame in
their 2003 empirical study. Berk and his colleagues argue that the CART methodology produces more valid results
than the conventional logistic regression model most often used in assessing racial effects and capital sentencing (Berk,
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In 1991, Radelet and Pierce published an analysis of Florida homicides between
1976 and 1987, including 415 death cases. The unadjusted results showed a race-ofvictim disparity of nearly 13 percentage points, notwithstanding similar aggravating
circumstances. A logistic regression analysis which included pertinent case
characteristics such as victim sex and the location of the crime still produced a significant
race-of-victim effect, with White victim crimes being 3.42 times more likely to end in a
death sentence (Radelet & Pierce, 1991).
In 1995, two studies were published, one from Connecticut (State v. Cobb, 1995)
and one from Kentucky (Keil & Vito, 1995). The Connecticut study was small,
examining 66 cases of capital murder guilt trials in 1973-1994. The study was submitted
in a direct appeal of a death sentence as support for a defendant-comparative [as opposed
to a case-comparative] proportionality review (State v. Cobb, 1995). The unadjusted data
indicated a higher capital murder conviction rate for Black defendants than for White and
lower conviction rate where the victim was Black. In a lengthy opinion, the Connecticut
Supreme Court rejected the study as insufficient overall, and also rejected the concept of
defendant-comparative proportionality review (State v. Cobb, 1995).
The second study by Keil and Vito in Kentucky, examined death eligible cases in 197691, and assessed the combined effect of racial influences at the prosecutorial charging
decision and jury sentencing decision in a logistic regression analysis that controlled for
case and crime characteristics. They found that Kentucky capital justice system was the
most punitive of Black defendants who killed White victims, whose odds of receiving the

Li & Hickman, 2004). Logistic regression, however, remains the methodology most often used in racial studies of
capital sentencing, and is the method used here.
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death penalty increased by 1.41 over other defendant-victim combinations, and who
suffered a similar increase in the odds of being charged with a capital crime in the first
place (Keil & Vito, 1995).
By 1999, the New Jersey Supreme Court became about the validity of the
methodology it employed for comparative proportionality review which had been
developed by Professor Baldus and his colleagues in 1988. They had been retained by
the state of New Jersey to develop a state-of-the-art method of assessing proportionality
in capital sentencing, and developed a complex, multivariate model using what came to
be known as an index-of-outcomes approach. This was adopted by New Jersey in 1991
and applied initially in 1992 (Marshall v. Loftin, 1992). The predictive value of the
Baldus model came under scrutiny by the New Jersey Supreme Court beginning in 1996,
when it initiated a review of the model, and lead in 1999 to the Proportionality Review
Project (In re Proportionality Review Project, 1980), under the supervision of a Special
Master, Judge David S. Baime.
The purpose of the study was to assess the continued viability and utility of the
system of proportionality review developed for the New Jersey by Professor Baldus, a
system which had proven unwieldy and unreliable (Baime, 2003). With the assistance of
Professors Weisburd and Naus, Judge Baime examined the Baldus methodology for
proportionality review and in his report to the Court in 2001 found the Baldus model to
be unreliable because of the small sample of cases on which it was originally based – a
defect which Professor Baldus had noted himself – and because of the unwieldy number
of variables used in the logistic regression analysis (Baime, 2001; Weisburd & Naus,
2001).
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In the same report, the first of continuing annual reports monitoring
proportionality review in New Jersey, Baime and his colleagues recommended a three
strategy analysis: bivariate analysis using a revised ‘salient factors’ selection, regression
analysis, and case-sorting techniques, looking at three decision points in the capital
sentencing process – penalty stage, life-death outcomes over all death eligible cases, and
prosecutorial election to seek the death penalty. When the results of the three analyses
converge, it can be safely assumed that the results are valid (Baime, 2003). The 2001
report utilizing these three methods showed no direct statistically significant race-ofdefendant or race-of-victim effect at any stage. The study did find a geographic effect,
with counties with a higher rate of Black victims – the more urban counties -- advancing
fewer cases to a penalty trial than less urban counties with more White victims (Baime,
2001; Baime, 2003).
In 1998, Professor Baldus and his colleagues completed a comprehensive study of
capital cases in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. “The most important influence on our
[Baldus and colleagues’] methodology” in developing the Philadelphia study was the ongoing New Jersey project (Baldus, Woodworth, Zuckerman, Weiner & Broffitt, 1998).
The Philadelphia study acknowledges the two primary shortcomings of the original New
Jersey work: 1) the small sample size on which it relied and 2) the unwieldy number of
variables used to try to capture case characteristics (Baldus et al., 1998). The sample size
issue was resolved in the Philadelphia study by the collection of data on 672 cases, 384 of
which went to the penalty stage, including cases where the jury hung and an automatic
life sentence resulted.
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The number of factors used in the core analysis of the Philadelphia data was
limited to on the number of statutory aggravators and mitigators as found by the jury, or
present in the case if not found by the jury (Baldus et al. 1998). Other logistic regression
models were run incorporating additional variables such as socio-economic status and
other case seriousness factors, and examining other decision points, such as the charging
decision. At the aggravator-mitigator weighing stage they found a statistically significant
race-of-defendant effect based on the total aggravators and mitigators accepted – an odds
multiplier of 29.0, significant at the .01 level, for Black defendants receiving the death
penalty. This effect was reduced, but still significant, when hung jury cases were
included in the core model (Baldus et al., 1998). Although more complex and evaluating
many more dimensions of the sentencing decision, this study of Philadelphia cases has
provided the approach for the study presented here.
In 2000, Brock and his colleagues published an ex post facto analysis of charging
and sentencing decisions in homicides in specified jurisdictions within Texas in 19801996. Using ratios they compared arrest to sentence results overall to selected
jurisdictions which had the highest numbers of both homicide arrests and death
sentences, all urban counties. The initial ratios analysis showed a rural-urban effect, with
more homicides and fewer death sentences in all urban areas except Houston/Harris
County. They also conducted ratio analyses controlling for defendant and victim race
legitimate case characteristics, using an additive scale of case seriousness from 0 to 4. A
White-victim effect was found to be strongly associated with defendant culpability as
measured by the aggravation scale (Brock et al., 2001).
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During the same time frame, the United States Department of Justice, in 2000 and
2001, released reports presenting unadjusted race-of-victim and race-of-defendant effects
in charging rates by federal prosecutors. These reports present essentially descriptive
analyses, but Baldus and Woodworth re-analyzed the data using logistic regression
techniques and confirmed a statistically significant race-of-victim effect (Baldus &
Woodworth, 2003).
In 2001, Professors Unah and Boger released their preliminary findings of an
analysis of racial disparities in capital sentencing in North Carolina (Unah & Boger,
2001). Using Baldus-type multiple regression analyses and logistic regression methods,
they examined all ‘potentially capital cases’ in North Carolina between 1993 and 1997
with the stated purpose of taking a “systematic look for patterns of racial discrimination
in capital sentencing in the South, employing data more recent than 1984” (Unah &
Boger, 2001). Because they were looking at all stages of the capital justice process,
included in their sample were all ‘death potential’ cases, including homicides that
resulted in a charge of murder, first degree murder or second degree murder, for the
period from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997.
The sample included 402 first degree homicides which went to a penalty phase
and resulted in a life or death sentence. A multistage sample technique was used to
create an additional group of cases of second degree murder resulting in life or term of
year sentences, for a total of 502 cases in the core dataset (Unah & Boger, 2001). The
independent variables included were not only the North Carolina statutory aggravating
and enumerated mitigating factors, but also factors reflecting other case, crime and
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demographic factors, for a total of thirty-six variables. The model did not include nonstatutory catch-all mitigating factors.
They ran models using all cases in the sample, only cases that went to trial, all
death eligible cases, cases where the prosecutor sought the death penalty, and cases
where there was a penalty trial. As the literature would predict, they found a statistically
significant race-of-victim effect – those murdering White victims were 3.4 times more
likely to receive the death penalty. They also found notable – but not statistically
significant -- differences in the death sentencing rate for Black defendants murdering
White victims, versus White defendants – at 6.4% versus to 2.6% and overall that Blackon-Black homicides resulted in the lowest death sentencing rate of any combination
(Unah & Boger, 2001).
Also in 2001, the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission of Virginia
released an analysis of the charging decisions in a sub-sample selected from a larger
sample of death eligible cases to reflect various geographic regions in Virginia. The
unadjusted data reflected a race-of-victim effect at the charging stage, but no race-ofdefendant effect. In a logistic regression model of charging decisions which controlled
for case characteristics reflecting crime seriousness, no statistically significant main
racial effect was observed, although an increased effect of two case characteristics –
defendant-victim relationship and crime jurisdiction – was seen when the victim was
White (Joint Legislative Audit and Review Committee, 2001).
Five studies were published in 2002, from Arizona (Bortner & Hall, 2002),
Illinois (Pierce & Radelet, 2002), Indiana (Ziemba-Davis & Myers, 2002), South
Carolina (MCord, 2002), and Nebraska (Baldus, Woodworth, Grosso, & Christ, 2000).
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Baldus and his colleagues looked at the rates of death sentencing in 189 death eligible
prosecutions in Nebraska, only 89 of which had progressed to the sentencing stage. The
logical regression analysis of these cases produced no racial effect, neither race-ofdefendant nor race-of-victim (Baldus, Woodworth, Grosso, & Christ, 2000). The original
Arizona study did not analyze for race effects (Bortner & Hall, 2002). Baldus and
Woodworth performed a separate analysis of the data, taking into account crime death
worthiness to the extent allowed by the data, and found a race-of-victim effect (Baldus &
Woodworth, 2003). Unadjusted race-of-victim effects were also found in the Indiana
study of 224 murder convictions. Only a rates analysis was performed, although a
multivariate regression analysis is proposed for the future (Ziemba-Davis & Myers,
2002).
Pierce and Radelet looked at over 4000 murder convictions in Illinois between
1988 and 1997, during which time only 76 death sentences were imposed. They looked
at unadjusted data, and performed a logistic regression analysis controlling for 28
variables in addition to race. No statistically significant race-of-defendant effect was
seen, there was a significant race-of-victim effect and a geographic effect seen in the
models (Pierce & Radelet, 2002). A limited analysis of South Carolina sentencing rates
in eleven homicide cases in 1998, selected by McCord for their extreme ‘depravity’
(McCord, 2002) also produced no race-of-defendant effect, but demonstrated a
substantial race-of-victim effect.
The most recent studies, in 2003 and 2004 continue the pattern. In 2003,
Raymond Paternoster and Robert Brame published an analysis of 1,311 Maryland death
cases death noticed and tried between July1, 978 and December 31, 1999, including 180
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cases which progressed to penalty trial (Paternoster & Brame, 2003). The unadjusted
results showed race-of-victim disparities which reached significance, but no significant
racial differences in sentencing, nor significant geographic disparities in sentencing. The
logistic regression results controlling for relevant case characteristics, however, showed
no significant race effects at the sentencing stage (Paternoster & Brame, 2003), although
a race-of-victim and geographic effect were significant at the charging and death-noticing
stages. As previously noted, in 2004, Berk, Li and Hartman re-analyzed the Maryland
data used by Paternoster & Brame using a CART analysis instead of logistic regression,
and maintain that it produces more reliable results – in this case, no racial effects at all
(Berk, Li, & Hartman, 2004).
Finally, Baldus and Woodworth have cited a third, smaller but ‘instructive’
analysis of race in capital sentencing by Professor James McAdams, a supporter of the
death penalty (Baldus & Woodworth, 2003). McAdams concludes that, despite increased
sophistication in the analyses performed to assess racial disparity in capital sentencing,
the results remain the same: 1) race-of-defendant is not, in and of itself, a statistically
significant ‘main effect’ in death sentencing; 2) race-of-victim is a significant factor in
death sentencing, with all defendants being more likely to receive the death penalty if
their victim is White; 3) Black defendants who kill White victims have the highest rate of
death sentence; and 4) Blacks who kill Black victims have the lowest rate of death
sentence (McAdams, 1998).
Research Problem
All of the studies noted above focused on whether there are main racial effects
showing racial disparity in capital sentencing outcomes, and most looked at sentence
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outcome as the product of racial bias in the entire capital justice process. None
examined the sentencing decision solely as a product of application of the Furman/Gregg
standards. This may be because of an unwillingness to abandon the argument lost in
McCleskey and a continued desire to prove a denial of equal protection and an inference
of purposeful discrimination in the form of the disparate impact of the entire capital
justice system on Black citizens (Baldus, 2004; Howe, 2004) There may be no
statistically significant disparity in the number or distribution of death sentences between
the races sufficient to demonstrate purposeful discrimination in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause. Even so, significant race-based disparity
in how the Furman sentencing standards – the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
– are applied may be indicative of unconscious racial bias which offends other
constitutional principles.
This nonpurposeful form of bias may be incapable of cure through legal process
yet still skew the sentencing process against Black citizens in a way repugnant to other
constitutional principles requiring jury impartiality, predictability in death sentencing and
protection from irrational sentence disparity. Identical aggravators may be applied more
harshly to one race or the other, or vary disproportionately based on the race of the
victim. Similarly, the mitigators may work better in reducing the chances of a death
sentence based on a defendant’s or the victim’s race – they might be more mitigatory for
White defendants than Black, despite comparability of the crime.
Earlier studies were not designed to look at latent, nonpurposeful racial
discrimination in the application of the Furman standards, but that is not to say that the
methodology cannot be used for such research. The studies fall generally into three
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approaches: 1) the use of unadjusted and case characteristic-adjusted data in rates
analyses and logistic regression models per Baldus, Paternoster and others; 2) the use of
CART methodology to analyze case data proposed by Berk et al. (2004) and used earlier
by Klein and Rolph (1991), and 3) the three stage combination of methods used by
Baime, Weisburd and Naus in New Jersey.
The Baldus-type model is generally considered the most reliable and costeffective, although the number of variables, the size of the case sample and the decision
point modeled will greatly affect the outcome (Unah & Boger, 2001; Baldus &
Woodworth, 2003). It is also the most flexible in turns of ease of use, and the ability to
use available information and produce meaningful results. For that reason, it has been
selected as the best methodology to assess racial invariance in the application of the
North Carolina Furman-based standards, as proposed here.
Logistic regression analysis of racial disparities in the facially neutral application
of Furman-based standards is a logical way to test for latent racism in jury decisionmaking under the Furman/Gregg design (Baldus & Woodworth, 2004). The Philadelphia
study suggests that the total number of aggravating circumstances – as measure of crime
seriousness and defendant culpability -- and to a lesser degree, mitigating circumstances
which a capital jury accepts may be the best predictors of capital sentence outcome
(Baldus & Woodworth, 2004; Baldus et al. 1998). If there are statistically significant
differences in the effect of jury acceptance and application of the same number of
aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances on sentencing outcomes among similarly
situated Black and White defendants, it arguably reflects unconscious racial attitudes of
jurors.
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To assess whether the Furman capital sentencing model is working in a raceneutral way, it is appropriate to look only at the sentencing stage; that is where the
Furman/Gregg factors operate. The question of race infecting other stages of the capital
justice process is important overall to the question of racial neutrality in the
administration of capital justice, but irrelevant to the question of whether capital juries
are color-blind. Indeed, studies have shown the largest racial bias effect appears at the
prosecutorial charging phase, and that it can be a function of politics and geography, as
well as race (Bienen, Weiner, Denno, Alison & Mills, 1988).
As discussed earlier, other studies have demonstrated extra-Furman influences,
such as geography and socioeconomic differences, which may be important in explaining
racial variance in capital sentencing results, but may be irrelevant to whether the Furman
standards are producing constitutionally acceptable results. The same can be said for
studies examining the jury panel itself, its racial composition and the lack of
understanding of its role in the sentencing process (Bowers, Sandys & Steiner, 1998;
Bowers, Steiner, & Sandys, 2001; Bowers & Foglia, 2003). While informative as to the
dynamics of the jury decision-making process, these do not address the core question of
whether the Furman model is working in a racially fair and equal way.
These studies are relevant to the question of juror unconscious predispositions to
impose the death penalty, overall and based on race – their own, the defendants’ or the
victims’ -- but are too limited to allow conclusions as to racial invariance in application
of the Furman standards universally or under a specific state’s standard. A meaningful
test of the Furman model would encompass a long time frame post-Furman, all or most
of the capital cases which reached the penalty stag during that time, under a specific
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statutory scheme compliant with the Furman standards implemented through
Gregg/Jurek/Proffitt statutory schemes. That is the study presented here, of most, if not
all, of the capital penalty decisions made by juries under North Carolina’s capital
sentencing statute over a period extending of more than ten years.
Hypotheses
The starting point should be the bare application of Furman to the facts and the
defendant, by the jury, at the sentencing stage using a Furman-compliant state capital
statute, in this instance that of North Carolina. The goal is to determine whether the
North Carolina statute works to channel capital jury discretion in imposing the death
sentence in racially invariant and thus constitutionally acceptable ways, as Furman and
Gregg intended. The hypotheses to be tested are:
1. Each unit increase in the level of aggravation a capital jury finds increases a
defendant’s odds of receiving a death sentence.
2. Each unit increase in the level of mitigation a capital jury accepts decreases a
defendant’s odds of receiving a death sentence.
3. Jury acceptance of aggravating circumstances increases the likelihood of a
death sentence more for Black defendants than similarly situated White defendants.
4. Jury acceptance of mitigating circumstances decreases the likelihood of a
death sentence more for White defendants than similarly situated Black defendants.
5. Jury acceptance of aggravating circumstances has a stronger effect on
defendants whose victims are White than those whose victims are Black, but whose
crimes are comparable, in increasing the odds of receiving a death sentence.
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6. Jury acceptance of mitigating circumstances has a stronger effect on
defendants whose victims are Black than those whose victims are White, but whose
crimes are comparable, in decreasing the odds of receiving a death sentence.
7. Jury acceptance of aggravating circumstances has the strongest effect on
increasing the odds of receiving a death sentence where the defendant is Black and his
victim is White.
8. Jury acceptance of mitigating circumstances has the strongest effect on
decreasing the odds of receiving a death sentence where the defendant is White and his
victim is Black.

50

Chapter Four
Methodology
Data
The analysis is based on information originally compiled from reviews of capital
murder trials, including penalty phase proceedings, in North Carolina between 1978 and
2002. LexisNexis searches of North Carolina Supreme Court and Court of Appeals cases
allowed identification of cases in which the defendants were convicted of or pled guilty
to first-degree murder, the state sought the death penalty, the trial progressed to a
sentencing phase whereby the jury heard evidence concerning aggravating and mitigating
factors, and the jury issued a binding recommendation for a sentence.
There are 1073 cases in the original dataset from trials held during the period
1978-2003. North Carolina sentencing procedures with regard to jury consideration of
mitigating factors changed in 1990, as a result of the holding in McKoy v. North
Carolina, 449 U.S. 433 (1990). Prior to McKoy the North Carolina sentencing statute
disallowed jury consideration of mitigating factors unless the jury had accepted them as a
whole. McKoy clarified the role of mitigators, holding that any individual juror could
rely on any relevant mitigating circumstance when making the sentencing decision. To
eliminate the possible effect of this change in how mitigators are used by North Carolina
juries, cases using pre-McKoy procedures as to mitigation and decided before May 1,
1990 were deleted. The May date was selected arbitrarily, being about 90 days from the
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issuance of the McKoy holding, as sufficient time for the McKoy principles to have been
adequately implemented by North Carolina’s trial courts.
The original data reflected the race-of-defendant and victim in three categories:
White, Black and ‘other’. In order to focus on the defined Black-White race distinction,
those cases where either defendant or victim race was coded as ‘other’ were deleted,
leaving a total of 632 cases involving Black or White victims and Black or White
defendants for use in the analysis. These cases include 374 Black defendants and 258
White defendants, and 244 Black victim and 388 White victim cases. The breakdown of
defendant-victim racial composition is White defendant/White victim = 232 cases; White
defendant/Black victim = 26 cases; Black defendant/Black victim = 218 cases, and Black
defendant/White victim = 156. Most of the cases (71%, n=450) are intra-racial, fairly
evenly distributed between Black-on-Black cases [218] and White-on-White cases [232].
Of the remaining 182 cases which are inter-racial, the small number of White-on-Black
cases [26] confounds any analysis of that set of cases or comparison of inter-racial
homicides.
Because the focus of the analysis is jury application of the aggravating and
mitigating factors in the sentencing decision, the dataset includes all cases where the
sentencing phase was conducted, including ‘hung jury’ cases where the jury declared that
they could not reach the required unanimous decision regarding a sentence, resulting in
the default sentence of life in prison; and retrials, where two separate juries considered
the facts independently and recommended a sentence in the same case. The inclusion of
hung jury cases has been found to decrease the effects of aggravators because a hung jury
always results in a life sentence (Baldus et al., 1998); however, because that sub-sample
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of cases represents application of the North Carolina sentencing statute, those cases have
been kept in the sample used for the analysis. As to retrial cases, inclusion of these cases
increases sample size of instances where separate juries applied accepted aggravators and
mitigators to reach the life-death decision, albeit to the same case, they are thus relevant
for purposes of examining racial invariance in this process.
The units of analysis are individual capital cases from the North Carolina Capital
Sentencing Project (NCCSP) database, limited to those cases which reached the penalty
phase and in which aggravators and mitigators were considered by the jury in penalty
trials in North Carolina between 1990 and 2003. The data was collected by M. D. Smith
(USF), Beth Bjerregaard (UNC-Charlotte) and Sondra J. Fogel (USF), for the North
Carolina Capital Sentencing Project. Because each homicide victim constitutes a
separate capital offense requiring separate jury findings and sentencing, each victim case
was coded separately, although the defendant was the same.
The data collection instrument [DCI] used was a Baldus-type instrument designed
to capture defendant, victim, jury and case characteristics, incorporating over 125 items.
The sources of the data were official state records, primarily those of the North Carolina
Supreme Court and the North Carolina Courts of Appeal as maintained by the North
Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), trial courts in the counties, and
other state criminal justice related agencies. To the extent possible, missing information
was supplemented by media reports and individual interviews.
Materials collected from state appellate records include defendant and state briefs,
as well as the jury Issues and Recommendation Form which records jury acceptance or
non-acceptance of aggravating and mitigating factors, and concludes with the jury’s
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sentencing recommendation. Historically, these materials have been published in hardcopy form and placed in two university law libraries in North Carolina, while other
locations have microfilm copies. Beginning with decisions returned from cases tried in
1999, hard copies have not been made available, but materials are accessible via an
electronic data file (http://www.ncappellatecourts.org ). This information was
supplemented with newspaper accounts of the trial where such coverage was available
through LexisNexis or Newsbank another electronic databank that includes varying years
of stories from eight North Carolina newspapers.
Defendant and crime information was obtained online from the North Carolina
Department of Corrections at (http://www.doc.state.nc.us/offenders). Through 1996,
victims’ age, race, and sex were taken from a commercially available CD-ROM, North
Carolina Vita Records: Deaths 1968-1996. For 1997-2002, victim personal information
was determined from some combination of court material (such as reference to the victim
in the state’s or defendant’s appeals briefs), newspaper accounts, or obituaries obtained
through World Wide Web search engines. Cases for which this information could not be
obtained are not included in the dataset.
The lack of a centralized source of information regarding capital murder trials in
North Carolina makes it difficult to determine the exact number of capital murder trials
conducted during the period covered in the data. Since appeals of death sentences are
automatically referred to the state Supreme Court, all of those cases are included. A large
proportion of defendants receiving a life sentence appeal their first-degree murder
convictions to the Courts of Appeal, so most of the life sentence cases included in the
database were identified in the lower appellate court records, as well as in those cases
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subsequently appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court, although that court has the
option of declining to hear the case.
There are two instances where defendants are unlikely to appeal, and therefore
their cases may not be included in the dataset. First, if a defendant pled guilty and
received a life sentence, there was little basis for appeal. Second, some defendants’
convictions were upheld but their death sentences vacated. If, upon retrial of the penalty
phase only, the sentence was life, there was no basis for appeal and no means to identify
these cases other than a county-by-county search. However, in the former situation no
penalty phase jury decision was involved, so such cases are irrelevant to the analysis. As
to the latter situation, while these retrial cases are relevant to the analysis of the jury
decision-making process, the number is likely to be small, based on the relatively small
number [76] of guilt-and-penalty phase retrials, which are included in the database.
A much smaller set of trials not included in the dataset are those that were
identified, but whose case materials are not available because hard copies were missing
from both libraries or not yet posted in electronic form. Given that the substantial
majority of capital cases are appealed to at least one of these courts, we estimate that the
available data contain reviews of more than 90% of all sentencing recommendations
made by North Carolina capital juries during the ten plus year period. This provides an
excellent sample to test racial effects on the sentencing decision under the Furman
model.
Some data is missing from some cases. If the jury recommendation form is
missing, the specific aggravators and mitigators used cannot be determined. Some cases
were ‘default life’ cases where either no aggravator was found or the aggravator was
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insufficient to recommend death. However, for the variables used in the instant study –
total and individual aggravators and mitigators accepted – only 7 cases were incomplete
from the 632 cases available. Comparisons of these missing data cases with those
remaining in the dataset revealed an overrepresentation of life sentence cases, suggesting
that the reduced dataset overstates the proportion of death sentence cases; however,
comparisons of major demographic and legal variables between life sentence cases
included and not included in the working dataset revealed no major sources of bias in the
cases used for the analysis.
Variables
For purposes of the analysis, the dependent variable is the defendant’s sentence, a
dichotomous variable coded 0 = life, 1 = death sentence. There are 302 life sentence
cases and 330 death sentence cases for the total 632 cases. There are four (4) classes of
independent variables: the two target variables of defendant and victim race and the two
Furman factors -- the statutory aggravating circumstances (“aggravators”) and statutory
and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances (“mitigators”) considered by capital juries at
the sentencing phase. These factors are analyzed both as ranges of total factors accepted
and as individual factors (Baldus et al. 1998, Baldus & Woodworth, 2004).
The total number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances submitted to,
rejected and/or accepted by each jury was coded for each case. Because the number of
mitigators which can be considered in a given case is limited only by relevance, as
opposed to the statutorily limited number of aggravators which can be considered, the
difference between the number of aggravators and mitigators considered can be very
large. In order to achieve an approximation of relative low, medium and high levels of
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jury-determined aggravation and mitigation, ranges of total aggravators and mitigators
accepted were used for comparison purposes (Baldus et al. 1998).
Variable Recoding
Table 1 sets out the variables and their coding and the case frequencies. All
independent variables have been dichotomized, with 1 representing the target category.
The original race-of-defendant and race-of-victim variables, after deleting the cases
where the race designation was ‘other’, were recoded from the original three categories of
‘White’=1, ‘Black’=2 and ‘other’=3, to White=0 and Black=1, in order to compare the
effect of a defendant or victim being Black on the likelihood of receiving the death
penalty under similar circumstances, to not being Black.
As noted above, numeric counts for the total number of aggravators and
mitigators accepted in each case were re-organized into ranges of total factors accepted
which could be compared. The ranges were chosen for rough approximation of levels of
aggravation and mitigation, from lowest represented by 1 and 2, mid-range by 3, and 4
and 5 representing the higher levels of case seriousness/defendant mitigation the jury
accepted (Baldus et. al, 1998). This also was intended to achieve some standardization in
comparative counts because of the very broad range of mitigators [0 to 50] considered
compared to the much smaller range of aggravators accepted [0-50]. Counts of
aggravating circumstances were recoded from actual counts to 0 aggravators accepted =
1, 1 - 2 aggravators accepted = 2, 3 - 4 aggravators accepted = 3, 5 – 9 aggravators
accepted = 4. Counts of mitigators accepted, including both statutory and non-statutory,
were coded 0 mitigators accepted = 1, 1-2 mitigators accepted = 2, 3 – 5 mitigators
accepted = 3, 6 – 10 mitigators accepted = 4, 11 – 50 mitigators accepted = 5. The ranges
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Table 1: Variable Frequencies and Coding.

BD/
WV

BD/
BV

632
258
374
388
244
26
232
156
N
Sentence
302
118
184
180
122
19
99
81
(0)Life
330
140
190
208
122
7
133
75
(1)Death
Total Aggravators Accepted
29
13
16
18
11
0
13
5
(1)=0
380
168
212
220
160
24
144
76
(2)=1-2
176
74
102
120
56
1
73
47
(3)=3-4
28
2
26
16
12
0
2
14
(4)=5-9
Total Mitigators Accepted
23
11
12
17
6
0
11
6
(1)=0
42
19
24
32
11
0
19
13
(2)=1-2
95
37
58
55
40
1
36
19
(3)=3-5
174
68
106
99
75
10
58
41
(4)=6-10
289
123
166
180
109
15
108
72
(5)=11-50
Aggravators (0=not submitted/ submitted not accepted/missing, 1=accepted)
241
99
142
168
79
5
94
68
Felony murder
135
52
83
100
35
0
52
48
Murder
Pecuniary Gain
203
97
106
135
68
5
92
43
HAC
273
105
168
158
115
11
94
64
Viol. Conduct
29
11
18
15
14
0
11
4
>1 Person Risk
179
61
118
104
75
3
58
46
Prior Viol. Fel’y
5
3
2
2
3
1
2
0
Murder In Jail
18
6
12
10
8
1
5
5
Prior Capitol Off.
75
33
42
50
25
3
30
20
Escaping
5
2
3
4
0
2
2
Kill Law Enf.Officer
21
4
17
3
18
0
4
14
Kill Gov’t Officer
Mitigators (0=not submit/submit not accept/individual accept not required/ not accept/missing,
1=accepted)
217
104
113
138
79
15
89
49
Insig.Prior Recd
299
144
155
180
119
15
129
51
Men/Em.Distress
78
26
52
45
33
4
22
23
D Age
207
102
105
118
89
18
84
34
D Capacity
25
7
18
16
9
0
7
9
D Minor Accomplice
48
26
22
30
18
6
20
10
D Under Duress
51
20
31
37
14
3
17
20
D Aid Prosecution
8
2
6
1
7
1
1
0
Vic. Consent
120
80
40
77
43
13
67
10
D Drink
137
64
73
86
51
10
54
32
D Drugs
103
53
50
64
39
6
47
17
D Physic. Abuse
36
17
19
19
17
0
17
2
D Sexual Abuse
73
35
38
39
34
7
28
11
D Broken Home
118
32
86
62
56
4
28
34
D Dad Gone
51
23
29
35
17
0
23
12
D Mom Gone
20
13
7
17
3
0
13
4
Foster Home
127
66
61
80
47
5
61
19
Parent Misconduct
67
25
42
35
32
2
23
12
D IQ
52
48
67
35
7
45
21
DSpecificMent.Cond. 101

218

All
Cases

White
D

Black
D

White
V

58

Black
V

WD/
BV

WD/
WV

103
115
11
136
55
12
6
11
39
65
94
74
35
63
104
14
72
2
7
22
1
3

64
104
29
89
9
12
11
6
30
41
33
17
27
52
17
3
42
30
28

were chosen for rough approximation of levels of aggravation and mitigation, from
lowest represented by 1 and 2, mid-range by 3, and 4 and 5 representing the higher levels
of case seriousness/defendant mitigation the jury accepted (Baldus et al., 1998).
As for each individual aggravating and mitigating circumstance accepted, the
coding instrument provided four (4) categories for aggravating circumstances: 1=not
submitted; 1=submitted but not accepted; 3=accepted and 9=missing/not found. These
were collapsed into two categories: 0 = not accepted [including not submitted, submitted
but not accepted, and missing cases] as the default category and 1 = accepted, as the
effect being tested.
The NC statutory aggravators are felony murder, murder for pecuniary gain,
heinous/atrocious/cruel murder, murder during violent conduct, murder resulting from
conduct threatening more than one person, prior violent felony, murder while
incarcerated, prior capital offense [adult and certain juvenile], murder of a law
enforcement officer, and murder of a court or governmental official in course of their
duties (Section. 15A-2000(e), NC General Statutes2004).
In the specifically enumerated mitigators in the North Carolina sentencing statute
are defendant has no significant prior record, defendant acted under emotional or mental
distress, defendant’s age, defendant lacked capacity to understand his act, defendant was
a minor accomplice, defendant acted under duress, defendant aided the prosecution, and
the victim consented to the conduct resulting in his death (Section. 15A-2000(e), NC
General Statutes, 2004).
The non-statutory mitigators allowed under the ‘catch-all’ provision at Section
15A-2000(3)(9) and recorded by the DCI are defendant’s alcohol abuse, defendant’s drug
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abuse, defendant was physically abused as a child, the defendant was sexually abused as
a child, defendant came from a broken home, defendant’s father was absent from the
home, defendant’s mother was absent from the home, defendant was in foster care,
defendant witnessed parental misconduct as a child, defendant’s low IQ, and defendant
suffers from a specific mental disease.
There were six (6) categories of possible responses in the coding instrument
applicable to both the statutory and non-statutory mitigators: 1=not submitted;
2=submitted but not accepted; 3=accepted; 4=acceptance of individual circumstances not
required of jury; 5=aggravators not accepted; and 8=aggravating circumstances ruled by
jury as not sufficient to justify death penalty. Since the analysis examines only the effect
of jury accepted aggravating and mitigating circumstances on life-death outcomes, these
variables were collapsed like the aggravators, and recoded to reflect acceptance as the
targeted effect -- 0=not accepted, encompassing all responses except ‘accepted’, and
1=accepted.
Statistical Analysis
Logistic regression analysis was employed, using SPSS to assess 1) the effect, if
any, of jury acceptance of aggravators or mitigators -- both as to total factors accepted
and individual factor effects -- on sentencing outcomes, and 2) whether there is racial
invariance of these effects. The core analysis controlled for the effect aggravators and
mitigators on sentencing outcomes by ranges of totals accepted, and defendant and victim
race and is reported at Tables 1 and 2. The second set of models takes into account the
possibility that some factors might have a greater effect on jury decision-making than
other factors also accepted in a case, and looks at the individual effect of each aggravator
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and mitigator on sentencing outcomes in an effort to sort out possible dilution of effect
from the initial grouping of factors in the first model set
The logistic regression analysis for both the total- and individual factor accepted
included eight models: all cases, Black defendant cases, White defendant cases, Black
victim cases, White victim cases, and defendant-victim race combinations
[WhiteD/WhiteV; BlackD/BlackV; BlackD/White V]. If a variable in one model showed
a statistically significant effect, the z-test for the statistical significance of differences in
effects across other models was used to determine if the difference between the two
models, and the subset of cases they represented, was actually significant (Paternoster,
Brame, Mazerole & Piquero, 1998). There were two few cases of White defendant-Black
victim cases [26] to analyze.
Logistic regression was employed because the dependent variable, life death
sentencing outcomes, is dichotomous and linear regression was not appropriate (Baldus et
al. 1998). Unlike linear regression, logistic regression does not produce coefficients
which predict actual values; logistic regression estimates the effect an independent
variable has on the likelihood – the odds – a particular outcome will occur, in this case, a
death sentence. The regression coefficient (B) indicates the direction and strength of a
variable’s effect on the likelihood of receiving a death penalty; the odds ratio, as
expressed by the exp (B), indicates the size of the change in the odds of a death sentence
a given variable has. Overall model fit was measured by the Wald Chi-square statistic,
with variance in sentencing outcomes explained by the model indicated in the Pseudo-R2
statistic. The unstandardized b coefficient statistical significance for each test variable is
reflected in the individual Wald statistic. Statistical significance of an effect is measured
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at alpha level .05 [p < .05], meaning that there is less than a 5% chance that the variable
has no effect on the odds of the outcome occurring in the population given the observed
effect for the sample analyzed. For purposes of the final analysis and discussion, only
results at alpha levels less than .05 are discussed.
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Chapter Five
Results
Models of Ranges of Total Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances Accepted
Table 2 sets out the results of the first five of the eight models run using the
ranges of total aggravators accepted and total mitigators accepted, selected to
approximate low, medium and high aggravation and mitigation levels for comparison
purposes. These models examined all cases, only Black defendant cases, only White
defendant cases, only Black victim and only White victim cases. Table 2 represents the
results of the defendant-victim race combination models. In each of the models, legally
relevant factors – the aggravating and mitigating circumstances – are statistically
significant at p < .05, and the effect is in the expected direction.
All-cases model.
The all-cases model shows each that each one unit increase in the range of
aggravating circumstances accepted increases the odds of any defendant receiving a death
sentence by a multiple of 5.4. Each increase in the range of mitigators accepted
decreases the odds of a death sentence by a multiple of .64, or 64%. Across all cases,
however, neither defendant nor victim race were significant predictors of a capital
sentence. There was an unexpected negative direction in these effects, indicating a slight
decrease in the likelihood of receiving a death sentence based on race of defendant or
victim, but as noted, neither was statistically significant. The predominance of intra-
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racial cases [71% of all cases] may, in part, account for this result.

The adjusted R2

statistic of .407 for the all-cases model indicates substantial variation left unaccounted for
by this model. Some of the remaining variation is likely due to the inability to measure
differences in the weights a juror might afford different aggravators or mitigators, the
“weighing” of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the balancing of their
respective net weights. It is also possible that legally irrelevant factors omitted from the
model may contribute to the unexplained variation.
Nevertheless, looking only at the all-cases model, the North Carolina capital
sentencing process appears at first glance to be operating as intended -- death sentences
appear to be largely based on legally relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances
and not on irrelevant or extra-legal factors such as defendant or victim race. However,
the subsequent models demonstrate that the effects of the level of jury-accepted of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances are not racially invariant, and that the
dissimilar effects of the level of aggravators accepted produce statistically significant
differences in the odds of receiving a death sentence based on defendant and/or victim
race.
Defendant race-specific models.
The results of the defendant race-specific models, set out in Table 2, demonstrate
an increased effect from jury acceptance of aggravators on sentencing for Black
defendants – the aggravators are substantially more aggravating for Black defendants,
with the odds of receiving a death sentence 2.7 times more than similarly situated White
defendants. The odds of a Black defendant receiving the death penalty increase by a
multiple of 7.7 with each unit increase in the level of aggravation, compared to an
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Table 2.
Logistic Regression Results (Odds Ratios): All-cases and Defendant and Victim Race-Specific Results Showing Effect of Total
Jury-Accepted Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances on Capital Sentencing Outcomes, North Carolina (May, 1990 December, 2002).
Variables

White
Defendants

All Cases
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S.E.

Exp(b)

Defendant Race
(DRACENEW)
Victim Race
(VRACENEW)

-.348

.232

.706

NA

NA

NA

-.145

.232

.865

.731

.503

2.078

Total Aggravators
(ATOTNEW)

1.679

.198

5.362*

1.057

.304

2.878*

-1.018

.115

.361*

-1.166

.189

.392*

Total Mitigators
(MTOTNEW)
Constant
R2 =
*p <. 05

.811

.407

B

S.E.

z-scores

Exp
(b)

B

Black
Defendants
B

S.E.

NA

NA

-.443

z=2.4*

z=.95

Exp
(b)

White
Victims
B

S.E.

Exp(b)

NA

.562

.267

.570*

.276

.642

NA

NA

NA

2.04

.272

7.693
*

1.56
2

.242

4.768*

-.937

.152

.392*

1.05
4

.145

.348*

zscores

Black Victims
B

S.E.

Exp
(b)

.386

.506

1.472

NA

NA

NA

z=.73

1.877

.348

6.535*

z=.52

-.929

.193

.395*

z=.31

2.069

-.569

1.17
3

-.650

.391

.445

.421

.397

increase of only 2.9 for White defendants. This is a statistically significant difference [z
= 2.4, p=.0164], demonstrating considerable variance in the effect of jury-accepted
aggravating circumstances on sentencing outcome, across defendant’s race. Some of this
variance may be attributed to the weights afforded individual aggravators and the
collective weighing process by the jury, but there is no data as to these factors. Even so,
it appears that although for each unit shift in aggravation level the odds of a death
sentence increase for all defendants, Black defendant may pay a higher premium for the
level of aggravation found.
As to the effect of mitigating circumstances, the slightly less mitigatory effect of
each unit increase in the range of mitigators accepted for a Black defendant [61%], over
the odds reduction from mitigation for a White defendant [69%] is essentially racially
invariant; there is no statistically significant difference [z =.95, p=.177]. In these racespecific models, Black defendants benefit from nearly the same discount enjoyed by
White defendants for each increase in the level of mitigation accepted. Moreover, since
the number of mitigators which may be considered is limitless, the mitigatory effect of
jury acceptance of mitigators is diluted with each additional mitigator accepted. Jury
acceptance of aggravators has a statistically significant different effect from acceptance
of mitigators [z=2.8, p=.0026]. This may be due to a dilution effect based on the
relatively small number of aggravating circumstances [11] available to North Carolina
juries versus the unlimited number of mitigating circumstances which can be considered,
but may also reflect the greater weight an aggravator – which must be found unanimously
and beyond a reasonable doubt -- carries for a jury. In any case, it appears that jury
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acceptance of aggravating circumstances drives the capital decision-making process, and
Black defendants are treated more harshly once aggravating circumstances are accepted.
As in the all-cases model, the effect of victim race fails to attain statistical significance
regardless of defendant race.
Modeling total aggravating and mitigating circumstances is also more predictive
for Black defendants than for White defendants. The R2 values increased in the Black
defendant case model to .445, compared to the .407 in the all-cases model. The White
defendant model was slightly less efficient than the all-cases model, with an R2 of .391.
This difference in predictive value -- nearly 45% for Black defendants compared to 39%
for White defendants -- is another indication that jury acceptance of aggravating
circumstances has an enhanced aggravating effect on sentencing outcomes for Black
defendants over White.
There is also a difference in the intercept values between the defendant racespecific models which should be noted. The constant in the White defendant model is
positive; it is negative in the Black defendant model. This indicates that omitted variable
bias and other sources of systematic error in these models enhance the odds of a capital
sentence for White defendants, but decrease them for Black defendants. Here again it is
likely that the absence of the weights applied to each factor and the balancing of accepted
aggravating and mitigating circumstances account for a considerable portion of this
modeling error. However, this may also be evidence of less arbitrariness operating in
Black defendant cases than in White defendant cases -- a lack of arbitrariness which may
work to the detriment of Black defendants in terms of consistently harsher treatment.
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Victim race-specific models.
The last two sets of models reported in Table 2 sets out the effects of different
ranges of aggravators and mitigators accepted on capital sentencing outcomes in victim
race-specific cases. Here again the effects of jury acceptance of additional aggravators
and mitigators are statistically significant and in the expected directions for both Black
and White victim cases, but the differences in the effects across models are not
statistically significant and thus not demonstrative of race-of-victim variation. It should
also be noted that the aggravator effect is stronger for Black victim cases [multiplier of
6.5] than for White victim cases [multiplier of 4.7], an unexpected result, but the
difference is not statistically significant [z = .73 (p=.4645)]. This difference may also
reflect the skewed distribution of intra- versus inter-racial cases in the sample, in which
there are more Black-on-Black cases [n=218] than Black-on-White cases [n=156].
As to the effects of mitigator acceptance by race of victim, the odds of a
defendant whose victim was White are reduced by 65% for each unit increase in the
range of mitigators the jury accepts, compared to a reduction of 60% for those whose
victims were Black, indicating an unexpected stronger mitigatory effect where the victim
was White. This may be because the majority of White victim cases had White
defendants [232/388], and thus this may reflect the overall advantage apparently enjoyed
by White defendants. In any case, the differences in mitigatory effects between White
and Black victim cases is not statistically significant [z = .52 (p=.6031)].

The race-of-

defendant effect is also significant for White victim cases, but not for Black victim cases,
but in an unexpected negative direction. The effect is small, decreasing the odds of a
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defendant whose victim is White receiving the death penalty by .43, and the difference in
the effect of race-of-defendant is not significant between Black and White victim cases
[z=.73 (p=.4654)]. As noted earlier, the negative constant for Black victim cases
indicates that omitted variables and systematic errors decrease the odds of a death
sentence when the victim is Black, and slightly increase the odds when the victim is
White. Although the Black victim model is a slightly better fit, the White and Black
victim models perform comparably in predicting sentencing outcomes, with comparative
R2 values of .421 and .397, respectively and neither is as predictive as the Black
defendant only case model.
All defendant-victim racial combination models.
The lack of a racially different effect from jury acceptance of aggravating factors
on capital sentencing outcomes is more clearly seen in the defendant-victim racial
combination models set out in Table 3. Analyses for White defendant-Black victim cases
could not be undertaken because there were too few cases [n=26], so it is not possible to
compare inter-racial cases. However, the results of the other three racial combinations
show substantial racial variance in aggravation effects.
As to intra-racial cases, the odds of a Black defendant who kills a Black victim
receiving a death sentence is increased 6.4 times for each unit increase in the range of
aggravators, compared to an increase by 2.8 times for a White defendant who kills a
White defendant. This difference is statistically significant [z=1.8, p=.0359]. Although
the multiplier is higher for Black defendants whose victim was White, than for Black-onWhite cases, the difference was not statistically [z=.8 p=.4237). There is, however, racial
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difference in effect between Black and White defendants when the victim is White. The
death sentence odds for the Black defendants with White victims increase by 9.8 for each
increase in the level of aggravation, compared to only a 2.8 multiplier for the White
defendant whose victim is White and killed under similarly aggravated circumstances.
This difference – Black defendants being nearly five (5) times more likely to receive a
death sentence than White defendants who commit comparable murders of White
victims, is statistically significant [z=2.4 (p =.0164)].
Consistent with the other models, the defendant-victim racial combination models
show significant effects of the ranges of mitigators accepted, regardless of defendant and
victim race. The odds of receiving the death sentence are reduced 69% in White
defendant-White victim cases, 60% in Black defendant-Black victim cases, and 63% in
Black defendant-White victim cases for each one unit increase in the range of mitigators
accepted. Although there is a slightly higher benefit for White defendants whose victims
are White, and the least effect is for Black defendants whose victims are White, the
differences are not statistically significant between any defendant-victim racial
combinations.
Here again the intercept for Black defendants, regardless of victim race, is
negative, indicating that omitted variables and systematic error account for a slight
reduction in the odds of receiving a death sentence; which may indicate less arbitrariness
operating in Black defendant cases than in White defendant cases, a lack of arbitrariness
which works to the detriment of Black defendants in terms of consistently harsher
treatment. Even so, the results indicate that Black defendants pay a premium for their
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race with each increase in the level of aggravation accepted by a capital jury, regardless
of the race of their victim; the highest price may be paid when the victim is White.
The R2 values show a better fit for the models for Black defendants whose victims
are White. The model explains 52% of the variance for Black defendant- White victim
cases, versus only 39% in White defendant-White victim cases, and 40% in Black
defendant-Black victim cases as well as the all-cases model. The fits for the intra-racial
models are slightly lower than for the all-cases model, but comparable.
Finally, it should be noted that the aggravator effect is consistently the stronger
effect across all models controlling for comparable levels of aggravation and mitigation.
Jury acceptance of aggravating circumstances appears to have the stronger effect on
sentencing outcome for Black defendants, regardless of the race of their victim, but is
strongest in Black defendant-White victim cases. This supports the conclusion that Black
defendants are treated more harshly by juries overall, in terms of the risk of a death
sentence, than White defendants whose crimes are comparable. This also supports the
conclusion that despite application of the Furman principles significant racial invariance
has not yet been achieved in capital sentencing, and sentencing bias based on a
defendant’s race is still a significant factor in capital sentencing.
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Table 3.
Logistic Regression Results (Odds Ratios): Race-of-Defendant and Race-of-Victim
Combinations Showing Effect of Total Jury-Accepted Aggravating and Mitigating
Circumstances on Capital Sentencing Outcomes, North Carolina (May, 1990 -December,
2002).
Defendant Race
White Defendant

Victim Race
Black Victim

Variables
4

White Victim

NA
Total Aggravators Accepted
Total Mitigators Accepted

Black Defendant

Black Victim

White Victim

B

S.E.

Exp(B)

NA

NA

NA

1.023

.306

2.782*

-1.182

.196

.307*

Constant

2.946

R2 =.385
Total Aggravators Accepted

1.851

.349

6.367*

Total Mitigators Accepted

-.931

.199

.394*

Constant

-.197

R2 =396
Total Aggravators Accepted

2.291

.431

9.883*

Total Mitigators Accepted

-.963

.238

.382*

Constant

-1.523
R2 =.517
z-scores

Defendant-Victim Combinations

Total Aggravators Accepted

Total Mitigators Accepted

WhiteD-WhiteV – BlackD-White V

z= 2.4*

z= .72

WhiteD-WhiteV -- BlackD-Black V

z=1.8*

z= .9

BlackD-WhiteV – BlackD-Black V

z=.8

z= .1

*p < .05

4

The small number of White-on-Black cases [n=26] prevented analysis of these cases.
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Results of Modeling Accepted Individual Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances.
All-cases models.
The results of the individual factor models are consistent with the totals accepted
models, and are set out in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 sets out the all-cases and the defendant
and victim race-specific models. Table 5 reports the racial combination models. In the
all-cases models, there was a significant race-of-defendant effect and a non-significant
effect for race-of-victim, both in an unexpected negative direction. The Black defendant
race-specific model and both victim race-specific models echo these negative directions
for the racial variables. Race-of-victim was negative and significant in the Black
defendant model, but positive and not significant in the race-specific White defendant
model. The difference in effect was not statistically significant. In the victim racespecific models, the defendant race effect was negative in both the Black and White
victim models, but neither was significant, nor was there any statistically significant
difference between them.
These unexpected directions are possibly a reflection of the Black defendant and
intra-racial crime sample bias. There is a higher percentage of Black defendants in the
sample overall, 59% [374/632] of the cases have Black defendants, compared to 41% of
the cases with White defendants [258/632]. As previously noted, the distribution based
on defendant and victim race is somewhat skewed. The preponderance overall are intraracial cases [71% (450/632)], of which the majority -- 58% (218/450) -- are Black-onBlack. As to the remaining 29% [182/632] of the cases which are inter-racial, 86%
[156/182 are Black-on-White -- only 26 cases involve White defendants and Black
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victims. Thus analysis and comparison is only viable as to how juries treated Black
defendants overall, and in comparison to White defendants who kill White victims. Thus
the race-of-victim effects cannot be fully evaluated, except as to White victims, but the
sample is sufficient to assess race-of-defendant effects.
Returning to the all-cases model, shown in Table 4, five (5) aggravators showed
strong, significant effects: felony murder [n=241], heinous/atrocious/cruel (HAC)
murder [n=203], murder during violent conduct [n=273], prior violent felony record
[n=179], and prior capital record [n=18]. HAC showed the strongest effect, with a
multiplier for the odds of receiving a death sentence of 5.7, over all cases where accepted.
These five aggravators had significant effects where accepted, in most models, and HAC
was significant in all models. The small number of cases in which a prior capital record
was accepted make the results as to this aggravator less reliable, although it is worth
noting that two-thirds [12/18] of the cases where this was a factor had Black defendants.
As to the mitigators, over all cases five (5) statutory mitigators and three (3)
nonstatutory mitigators had a significant effect, all in the expected negative direction: no
significant prior record [n=217], age [n=78], capacity [n=207], minor participation in the
crime [n=25], and duress [n=48]. The nonstatutory mitigators which showed a
significant effect were alcohol abuse [n=120], father absent from childhood home
[n=118], and defendant had a specific mental illness [n=101]. All were in the expected
negative direction. Sample size was an issue as to the mitigation effect overall of
defendant as minor accomplice, duress and age, and this issue becomes more pronounces
as the models are parsed into racial-specifics and combinations. As would be expected
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with the addition of variables, the model fit increased for the all-cases model from .407
using only ranges of aggravation and mitigation accepted, to .516 for the individual factor
model of all cases. That is, defendant and victim race, and jury acceptance of individual
aggravating and mitigating factors explains almost 52% of the variance in the life-death
decision.
Defendant race-specific models.
Consistent with the all-cases model, there is a negative race-of-victim effect in the
Black defendant model, which is significant and indicates a 58% decrease in the
likelihood of a death sentence based on victim race – but the difference with the White
defendant effect is not statistically significant [z=.31, p=.03783]. As to the aggravators,
the same five aggravators significant in the all-cases models are also significant in either
the Black or White defendant model, and a sixth aggravator – murder for pecuniary gain
[For $$] shows a significant positive effect on the life-death outcome in both Black and
White defendant models. There are race-based differences, some of which are significant
and some of which are not.
Felony murder and a prior capital felony record are not significant for White
defendants but are for Black defendants -- but the differences in effect are not statistically
significant. The effects of a prior violent felony record and murder for pecuniary gain are
also significant for Black defendants but not for White, but here the differences are
statistically significant. A Black defendant is almost 9 times more likely to receive the
death sentence if he has a prior violent felony record than a White defendant with such a
record. Where the murder is found by the jury to have been for pecuniary gain, the Black
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defendant’s odds of receiving a death sentence increase by a multiplier of 3.3, compared
to only a multiplier of 1.2 for a White defendant.
Two of the aggravators, HAC and murder during violent conduct, have a
significant enhancing effect on the likelihood of a death sentence for both Black and
White defendants. There is no significant difference in the effect of violent conduct, and
the odds ratios are comparable – a 3.91 increase for White defendants and a 3.95 increase
as to Black defendants. HAC shows a much greater and statistically significant different
[z=2.0, p =.0228] effect on Black defendants – the multiplier for White defendants where
HAC has been accepted in aggravation is 4.2, versus 15.8 for Black defendants. As
discussed more particularly below, this difference increases dramatically in the racial
combination models, showing the greatest effect where the defendant is Black and the
victim is White, and the multiplier increases to 83.2.
The significant mitigatory effects were in the expected negative direction and
similarly mixed to some degree by race of defendant. Only defendant’s age and capacity
were significant for both Black and White defendants with age being slightly more
mitigatory for Black defendants [n=52] than White [n=26], and lack of capacity for
White defendants [n=102] than for Black [n=105], but the differences were not
significant [age z=.2, p=.4207]; capacity z=.5, p=.3805]. A defendant’s minor role in the
crime [n=25] significantly reduced a Black defendant’s odds of a death sentence by 94%
and showed no significant effect for White defendants, but the difference was not
statistically significant [z=.004, p=.4984], and the result undoubtedly affected by the
small sub-sample size.
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One interesting result was the effect of the lack of a significant prior record
[n=217]. This factor was significant for White defendant cases [104] but not for Black
defendant cases [113], reducing the odds of receiving a death sentence by 88%, compared
to only 37% if the defendant was Black, and the difference in effect was statistically
significant [z=2.6, p=.0047]. On the other hand, the effect of a jury’s acceptance of a
defendant’s duress [n=48] was significantly [z=1.96, p=.025] greater for Black defendant
cases [22] than for White [25], reducing the odds of a death sentence by 92% for Black
and only 65% for White defendants.
As in the level of aggravation and mitigation models, the effect of jury acceptance
of the HAC aggravator is strongest for Black defendants, and the difference in effect
between Black defendants [15.8 multiplier] and White defendants [4.2 multiplier] is
significant [z = 2.0, p=.0228]. HAC has the strongest effect of all for Black defendants
whose victims are White, with a multiplier of 83.2. The difference between the HAC
aggravation effect on White defendant-White victim cases and Black defendant-White
defendant cases shown on Table 5 was also statistically significant [z=2.1, p =.0179], as
was the difference in the HAC effect between White and Black intra-racial crime
[z=1.97, p =.0244]. One interesting result was the lack of statistical significance in the
difference of the HAC effect between Black-Black and Black-White cases; it seems that
Black defendants are going to be penalized more than White defendants in terms of effect
on sentencing from acceptance of the HAC aggravator regardless of the race of their
victim, but the greatest effect will be if the victim is White. Again, it must be noted that
more [58%] of the Black defendant cases had Black victims.
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Felony murder was significant in the all-cases model but not statistically
significant for White defendants in the defendant-race specific model or the White-onWhite case model. As tables reflect, the effect of this aggravator is comparable across all
models, and there was no statistically significant difference among them. This may be in
part because felony murder is not usually a stand-alone aggravator unless the defendant is
the triggerman, since the holdings in Enmund v. Florida (1982) and Tison v. Arizona
(1987), and because of the double-dipping issue which prevents counting both the felony
itself and felony murder as two separate aggravators. Felony murder had a significant
aggravating effect on Black defendant cases overall, but only in the Black intra-racial
model. It was significant for Black defendants, but the difference in effect on Black and
White defendant cases was not significant. Felony murder was also not significant.
except where the victim was White. Murder for pecuniary gain [For $$] was Four
others – felony murder, murder during violent conduct, prior violent felony record and
prior capital offense – were also statistically significant in the all-cases model. As to the
defendant race-specific models, as would be expected, more individual aggravators were
significant for Black defendants than for White. For Black defendants felony murder,
murder for pecuniary gain, murder during violent conduct, prior violent felony record,
and prior capital offense were all significant, in addition to HAC. For White defendants,
only HAC, and murder during violent conduct had a statistically significant effect.
Victim race-specific models.
As to the victim race-specific cases, four of the aggravating factors were
significant for both Black and White victim cases: felony murder, HAC, murder during
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violent conduct, and prior violent felony, but the differences were not statistically
significant. Prior capital offense was also significant if the victim was Black, in the small
sample of Black victim cases where this aggravator was accepted (n=8). Jury acceptance
of the HAC aggravator proved to have a strong increased effect on the odds of a Black
defendant receiving the death penalty.
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Table 4.
Logistic Regression Results (Odds Ratios): All-Cases, Defendant and Victim Race-Specific Models Showing Effect of Jury Accepted Individual Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances on Capital Sentencing Outcomes, North Carolina (May, 1990
– December, 2002).

B

All Cases
S.E. Exp(b)

White Defendants
B
S.E. Exp(b)

z **
B

Black Defendants
S.E.
Exp(b)
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Defendant Race
Victim Race
Felony murder
For $$
HAC
Viol. Conduct
>1 Person Risk
Prior Vio. Fely
In jail
Prior Cap. Off.
Escaping
Kill Officer
Kill Gov. Off.
No SigRec.
Mt/Em Dis.
D Age
D Capacity

-.683
-.410
1.143
.470
1.748
1.045
.507
.967
-.009
1.654
.598
-.125
.337
-1.163
.221
-1.383
-1.322

.307
.296
.268
.300
.271
.257
.547
.297
1.449
.756
.385
1.307
.720
.269
.260
.384
.260

.505*
.664
3.136*
1.599
5.744*
2.844*
1.661
2.630*
.992
5.226*
1.818
.882
1.401
.313*
1.247
.251*
.267*

NA
.126
.795
.160
1.428
1.364
-.332
-.171
-.196
1.655
.830
19.914
-.612
-2.129
.144
-1.563
-1.614

NA
.693
.477
.530
.447
.515
1.044
.532
1.837
1.639
.665
27292
1.480
.493
.463
.801
.441

NA
1.134
2.214
1.174
4.172*
3.913*
.717
.843
.822
5.232
2.294
45E+08
.542
.119*
1.155
.209
.199*

D Minor Acpl.

-2.598

.768

.074*

-20.30

14013

.000

--

-2.694

.957

D Duress
D Aid Prosec.
Vic. Consent

-1.805
-.094
-.745

.506
.457
1.186

.164*
.910
.475

-1.051
-1.365
.617

.705
.811
2.226

.349
.255
1.853

2.0
.6

-3.926
2.335
-19.15

1.232
.818
16329.

.94
1.2
1.46
2.0*
.02
2.9*
.44

2.6*
.2
.5

NA
-.872
1.520
1.194
2.760
1.375
1.196
2.203
17.359
2.484
1.210
-.821
.909
-.464
.323
-1.751
-1.336

NA
.394
.395
.463
.473
.386
.808
.453
25592.
1.058
.717
1.699
.861
.398
.380
.550
.399

NA
.418*
4.574*
3.299*
15.796*
3.954*
3.307
9.055*
34E+07
11.994*
3.355
.440
2.482
.629
1.381
.174*
.263*
.068*
.020*
10.328*
.000

B
-.373
NA
1.305
1.065
2.659
2.021
1.092
1.514
16.982
3.901
1.507
20.437
-.089
-.788
.449
-1.166
-1.471

Black Victims
S.E.
Exp(b)
.811
NA
.492
.668
.570
.538
.919
.570
26723
1.477
.897
40192
1.529
.486
.439
.711
.488

.689
NA
3.688*
2.900
14.282*
7.548*
2/980
.4.543*
2372278
49.464*
4.515
7.5E+08
.915
.455
1.567
.312
.230*

-.755

1.094

.470

-4.289
.939
-19.03

1.511
1.250
14153

.014*
2.559
.000

*p <.05
** 1 The z-score indicates whether the difference in effect between two models is statistically significant ((Paternoster, Brame, Mazerole & Piquero, 1998).

z
B

.6
1.1
1.7

1.56
.9
.02

-.627
NA
.960
.541
1.934
.892
1.005
1.007
-.813
1.268
.200
-1.084
.834
-1.760
.010
-1.959
-1.483
22.796
-1.250
.273
21.183

White Victims
S.E
Exp(b)
.367
NA
.365
.390
.369
.360
.786
.413
1.696
1.225
.474
1.624
.910
.386
.366
.540
.357

.534
NA
2.611*
1.178
6.919*
2.441*
2.731
2.737
.443
3.555
1.222
.338
2.032
.172*
1.011
.141*
.227*

7983

.000

.618
565
40193

.287
1.314
1.6E+09

Table 4, continued.
Logistic Regression Results (Odds Ratios): All-Case, Defendant and Victim Race-Specific Models Showing Effect of JuryAccepted Individual Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances on Capital Sentencing Outcomes, North Carolina (May,1990 December, 2002).
All Cases
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D Alcohol
D Drugs
D Physical Abuse
D Sexual Abuse
D Broken Home
D Father Absent
D Mother Absent
D in Foster Home
D Saw Parent’l Misc.
D Low IQ
D Spec. Mtl Ill
Constant
2

R

*p < .05

B

S.E.

Exp(b)

-.805

.341

.115

.319

-.168
.124

White Defendants
B

S.E.

Exp(b)

.447*

-.654

.603

1.122

-.302

.603

.353

.845

-.389

.531

.677

.543

1.131

-.523

.802

.592

-.139

.359

.871

-.283

.580

.754

-.756

.334

.470*

-1.94

.795

.144*

-.144

.467

.866

-1.88

1.074

.153

.611

.711

1.843

2.682

1.250

14.612*

.067

.306

1.069

.695

.507

z

Black Defendants
-.693

.614

.500

-.062

.645

.739

.302

.494

1.352

.060

.630

-.461

.630

.631

-.187

.684

.830

-.471

.478

.625

1.345

1.014

3.840

1.350

1.180

3.858

-.482

.716

.618

2.003

S.E.

Exp(b)

White Victims

.520

1.1

B

z

S.E.

1.8*

Exp(b)

Black Victims

B

B

S.E.

Exp(b)

.940

-.873

.485

.418

1.062

.132

.457

1.141

.493

.563

1.638

-.279

.569

.756

-.235

.535

.790

-.395

.424

.674

-.327

.513

.721

-1.217

.525

.296

1.283

.720

3.606

1.465

.934

4.329

-.834

.674

.434

.731

1.265

2.078

1.584

1.522

4.873

.872

.860

2.391

-.694

.510

.500

-.397

.535

.672

.558

.447

1.745

.231

.395

1.260

.397

.697

1.488

-.385

.595

.681

.279

.708

1.322

-.70

.311

.495*

-.917

.533

.400

-.598

.489

.550

-.624

.607

.536

.96

.595

.571

1.813

-.551

.427`

.576

.478

1.301

-1.71

-1.52

.600

.516

.626

.888

.607

.568

The strongest effect is seen on Black defendants who commit crimes found by the jury to
be heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC). The odds multiplier for HAC in the all-cases
model was 5.7, but in the Black defendant model rose to 15.8, compared to a decrease as
to White defendants from the all-cases model to 4.2. The difference in effect of the HAC
aggravator on the likelihood of receiving a death sentence, between White and Black
defendants was statistically significant [z=2.1 (p<.05)]. An unexpected result was the
disparity in the effect of the HAC aggravator based on victim race. Jury acceptance of
the HAC aggravator increased the odds of a death sentence more when the victim was
Black – by a multiplier of 14.3 -- than when the victim was White, which increased the
odds by a multiplier of 6.9, but the difference between them was not statistically
significant [z=1.1, p=.2713)]
As to mitigating circumstances, only one factor was significant in all eight models
using the individual aggravating and mitigating circumstances – defendant’s capacity to
understand the criminality of his act. The seven mitigators significant at p<.05 over all
cases were defendant’s non-significant prior record, age, defendant was a minor
accomplice, under duress, abused alcohol, defendant’s father was absent from the
childhood home, and defendant suffered a specific mental illness. All of these effects
were in the right direction, indicating a mitigatory effect – albeit slight -- on sentencing
when accepted. When looking mitigation effects in the defendant race-specific models,
in addition to defendant’s capacity, both sets of defendants showed other mitigatory
effects significant at p<.05, although these additional mitigators differed in some respects
by race.
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The White defendant model showed significant mitigatory effects as to no
significant prior record, defendant’s age, lack of capacity, duress, defendant aided the
prosecution. The Black defendant model showed age, lack of capacity, minor
accomplice, duress, and aid to the prosecution as significant. All of the effects were in
the right direction, indicating a mitigatory effect, except as to aiding the prosecution,
which was significant for Black defendants but in the wrong direction, indicating an
increase by a multiplier of 10, in the odds of a death sentence for Black defendants who
helped the prosecution. The difference between Black and White defendants was not
statistically significant [z=1.1 (p=.2713)]. There was a similar unexpected positive
direction for the foster home mitigator as to White defendants, producing a statistically
significant multiplier of 14.1, but the difference was similarly not significant [z=1.1
(p=.2713)]. In fact, there were no significant differences in the mitigatory effects of any
of the mitigating factors, between Black and White defendants.
The defendant victim race-specific models showed a reduced number of
mitigatory factors where the victim was Black, with only defendant’s capacity and duress
showing a significant effect. The White victim model produced significant effects from
where the defendant had no significant prior record, and based on his age, lack of
capacity, duress, and the father being absent from the home. All effects were in the
expected direction and none of the differences in mitigatory effects based on victim race
were statistically significant.
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Defendant-Victim racial combination models.
The defendant-victim racial combination models are reported in Table 5 produced
mitigatory effects consistent with the all-cases models. Defendant age and lack of
capacity were significant for all racial combination, but the differences across models
were not significant. The same mitigatory factors were significant for Black defendants
in the racial combination models as had been in the defendant race-specific model, except
defendant as minor accomplice was not significant in any racial combination model, and
duress was only significant in the Black defendant-Black victim cases. The foster home
and witnessing parental misconduct mitigators showed as significant in White-on-White
crime but not in the Black intra- or inter-racial crimes. There was a statistically
significant difference in the mitigatory effect of defendant’s duress on intra-racial cases,
where the mitigatory effect was stronger for Black-on-Black crime, than for White-onWhite crime [z=2.4 (p=.0214). Except for the duress mitigator for Black defendants,
there were no significant differences in mitigatory effect of other factors and there was no
significant differences in the effect of any of the mitigators as between interracial cases
where the defendant was Black, or any cases where the victim was White.
As to model fit, the R2 values increased for all of the individual factor models
over the total factors accepted models. The all-cases value went from .407 to .516,
explaining 52% of the variance. The White defendant case model R2 value increased
from .391 to .588, indicating that 59% of the variance is explained by the individual
aggravating and mitigating factors. The Black defendant model value increased from an
R2 value of .445 to .626, explaining nearly 63% of the variance between sentencing
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outcomes. The victim race-specific models also increased from an R2 value of .421 to
.568, increasing in fit by 15 percentage points. The model fit for Black victim cases also
improved, the 40% [R2=.397] explained by the all-cases model growing to nearly 61%
[R2=.607] of the variance explained in the individual factor Black victim case model.
The use of individual factors improved the fit of the racial combination models.
The White-on-White model using individual factors explained about 60% [R2=.598] of
the sentencing outcome variance, over only 39% of the variation explained by levels of
aggravation and mitigation. The Black-on-Black model improved from 40% using the
ranges of factors accepted, to 62% with individual factors accepted. Overall, the models
appear to be more efficient in predicting sentencing outcomes for Black defendants, and
when individual factor are measured. The largest increase in fit between the aggravationmitigation level models and individual factor models is for Black-on-White crime, going
from explaining 52% to 80% of the variation in sentencing outcome.
The North Carolina statute overall seems to be working efficiently to produce
consistent sentencing results, particularly for Black defendants who endure a consistent
and predictable disadvantage as to how the aggravating factors affect their sentencing
outcome. Most of the unexplained variance is in cases where the defendant is White.
While some of the unexplained variance is attributable to unknown factors such missing
variables and systemic error, and to the inability to factor in the individual weights of the
factors or the weighing of the aggravators and mitigators, it appears that race is playing a
role in how the Furman-compliant standards are applied, and raising the question of
arbitrariness and possible jury bias.
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Table 5.
Logistic Regression Results (Odds Ratios): Defendant-Victim Racial Combination Models Showing Effect of Jury-Accepted
Individual Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances on Capital Sentencing Outcomes, North Carolina (May, 1990 –
December, 2002).
White Defendant – White Victim1
B
S.E.
Exp(b)
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Felony murder
For $$
HAC
Viol. Conduct
>1 Person Risk
Prior Vio. Fely
In jail
Prior Cap. Off.
Escaping
Kill Officer
Kill Gov. Off.
No SigRec.
Mt/Em Dis.
D Age
D Capacity
D Minor Acpl.
D Duress
D Aid Prosec.
Vic. Consent
p .05

.823
.014
1.506
1.287
-.114
.024
-.281
.288
.292
19.775
-.573
-2.205
.160
-2.349
-1.615
-21.001
-.633
-.507
19.809

.512
.546
.484
.543
1.103
.583
2.046
1.850
.675
27229.935
1.498
.553
.527
.898
.490
13525.905
.726
.906
40192.970

2.277
1.014
4.510*
3.620*
.892
1.025
.755
1.333
1.339
387506038.119
.564
.110*
1.174
.095*
.199*
.000
.531
.602
400870714.217

Black Defendant – Black Victim
S.E.
B
Exp(b)
1.385
.871
3.042
1.999
1.450
1.857
17.080
3.465
1.146
20.187
-.001
-.604
.348
-1.654
-1.420
-1.146
-4.656
2.944
-18.858

.528
.681
.625
.571
.983
.639
25916.037
1.521
1.014
40192.970
1.628
.538
.477
.780
.535
1.142
1.527
1.840
16422.489

3.996*
2.389
20.952*
7.385*
4.265
6.403*
26175712.907
31.971*
3.145
584927857.974
.999
.547
1.416
.191*
.242*
.318
.010*
18.997
.000

Black Defendant – White Victim
B
S.E
Exp(b)
1.380
2.627
4.421
.860
3.206
4.247
NA
19.992
1.121
-42.428
3.061
-1.302
-.848
-2.797
-2.389
-49.299
-17.048
3.723
NA

.858
1.067
1.246
.817
2.004
1.154
NA
6950.775
1.679
24716.259
1.719
.933
.941
1.141
.954
12440.513
9955.123
1.538
NA

3.974
13.832*
83.214*
2.363
24.684
69.908*
NA
481179454.364
3.067
.000
21.340
.272
.428
.061*
.092*
.000
.000
41.39*
NA

Table 5, continued .:
Logistic Regression Results (Odds Ratios): Defendant-Victim Racial Combination Models Showing Effect of Jury-Accepted
Individual Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances on Capital Sentencing Outcomes, North Carolina (May, 1990 –
December, 2002).
White Defendant – White Victim1
B
S.E.
Exp(b)
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D Alcohol
D Drugs
D Physical Abuse
D Sexual Abuse
D Broken Home
D Father Absent
D Mother Absent
D in Foster Home
D Saw Parent’l Misc.
D Low IQ
D Specific Mental Illness
Constant
2

-1.135
-.107
-.684
-.599
-.188
-2.334
-1.595
2.541
1.161
.054
-1.069

.669
.655
.591
.810
.670
.916
1.164
1.298
.601
.792
.588

.321
.898
.504
.549
.828
.097*
.203
12.689
3.192
1.056
.343

1.562
.598

Black Defendant – Black Victim
B S.E.
Exp(b)
-.527
.163
-.569
1.469
.316
-.295
1.634
1.387
-.497
.239
-.950

.722
.731
.831
1.328
.649
.551
1.001
1.528
.607
.795
.686

.591
1.176
.566
4.346
1.372
.745
5.125
4.004
.608
1.270
.387

-2.026

Murder for Pecuniary Gain:
HAC
During Violent Conduct
Prior Violent Felony

z= 2.18*
z= 2.1*
z= .44
z= 3.27*

No Sig. Prior Record
Defendant Age
Defendant Capacity

z= .83
z= .3
z= .8

Defendant Aid Prosecutn
D Father Absent

z= 1.8*
z= .8

1.932
-.396
.822
18.889
.777
-1.203
-.194
3.054
-.982
.214
1.044

2.357
1.051
1.503
7295.652
1.854
1.091
1.544
10.908
1.667
1.367
1.016

6.903
.673
2.275
159781410.692
2.176
.300
.823
21.193
.375
1.239
2.841

-2.933

.624
R
*p < .05
1
There were two few cases (26) for SPSS to produce results for the White Defendant-Black Victim cases.

White Def/White Victim – Black Def/White Victim

Black Defendant – White Victim
B
S.E
Exp(b)

.795

Z-Scores
White Def/White Victim – Black Def/Black Victim
Felony Murder
z= .76
HAC
During Violent Conduct
Prior Violent Felony
Prior Capital Felony
No Sig. Prior Record
Defendant Age
Defendant Capacity
D Under Duress

z= 1.97*
z= .9
z= 2.1*
z= 1.32
z= 2.07*
z= .6
z= .4
z= 2.4*

D Father Absent

z= 1.905*

z- scores
Black Def/White Victim – Black Def/Black Vic.
Felony Murder
z= .025
Murder for Pecuniary Gain z= .82
HAC
z= 1
During Violent Conduct
z= 1.14
Prior Violent Felony
z= 1.8*
Prior Capital Felony
z= .0000+
No Sig. Prior Record
z= .68
Defendant Age
z= .8
Defendant Capacity
z= .9
Defendant Aid Prosectn
D Father Absent

z= .32
z= .7

Chapter Six
Conclusions

Study Purpose and Results
The purpose of this study was to assess the degree to which capital sentencing
under the guided discretion sentencing standards required by Furman v. Georgia (1972)
has produced predictable, consistent and racially invariant death sentencing patterns. It
was not intended to assess the degree to which racial bias might already have influenced
the progress of a case to the life-death decision, but was limited to the penalty stage,
where Furman applies, in order to look at possible racial influences on the sentencing
process itself. Thus, to the extent race entered into the decisions which resulted in the
racial composition of the sample reaching the penalty stage, it is not measured or
considered here. It is possible, however, that any cumulative racial bias injected into the
process during earlier discretionary decisions arguably makes racial variance discovered
at the sentencing stage a conservative reflection of race in the capital justice system
overall.
To isolate the sentencing decision in order to look at racial disparities or the lack
of them, it was logical to compare sentencing outcomes among Black-White race specific
cases, defendant-victim racial combination cases and all cases as the product of the
application of the only legally-relevant sentencing criteria under Furman, the statutorily
88

expressed aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The aggravators presumably
encompass all criteria which make a crime death worthy, and the mitigators allow broad
consideration of factors which might offset the crime and justify a life sentence in his
particular case. The goal was to determine whether jury sentencing discretion under
Furman has been sufficiently channeled to avoid or minimize to insignificant levels the
influence of extra-legal considerations such as racial prejudice.
The study looked at the sentencing decisions of 632 capital juries in North
Carolina between May 1990 and December 2002 after they applied North Carolina’s
Furman-compliant capital sentencing statute (Section 15A-2000, NC General Statutes).
By controlling for defendant and victim race and the numeric range of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances accepted and applied by the jury – and also the effect of each
factor individually -- it was possible to observe the degree to which these factors affected
the risk of defendants receiving a death sentence for comparable crimes during the
selected time-frame, and the degree to which these effects differed by race. To be
conservative, only results at an alpha level of less than .05 are reported, indicating a
confidence level of more than 95%.
In other words, the study tried to determine if the North Carolina death sentencing
statute has operated to produce the consistent and predictable results which Furman held
the Eighth Amendment to require, and if it does so in a race-neutral way. A
demonstrated, statistically significant lack of racial invariance in how a Furmancompliant sentencing statute works when operating in a presumptively race-neutral
setting, should call into question the continued validity of the current, Furman-based
death sentencing model.
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Constitutional principles of racial equity, jury impartiality, arbitrariness of
punishment, require a death sentencing process which if not completely even-handed is
sufficiently consistent and predictable to leave no room for doubt as to its fundamental
fairness between the races. Statistically significant racial disparities in how facially raceneutral sentencing standards are applied, regardless of how relatively even the unadjusted
life-death sentencing rates may be distributed between Black and White defendants, are
indicative of the operation of racial bias in the system which should be just as
unacceptable under the law as the stark Black-White disparities seen pre-Furman.
However, significant bias observed at this point in the societal integration curve is
probably not the result of institutionally purposeful denial of equal protection under the
law; it is more likely the result of the continued effect of lingering unconscious, culturebased racial stereotypes. The issue is whether any statistically significant racial disparity,
intended or not, is an acceptable outcome in the operation of our laws where death is the
consequence.
Key Findings
The results of the study support a conclusion that the Furman-based criteria North
Carolina has adopted to guide the capital sentencing decision have substantially reduced
unpredictability in death sentencing in that state. The results do not support a conclusion
that Furman has worked to eliminate or even reduce race-based arbitrariness to
constitutionally insignificant levels in capital sentencing in North Carolina. These are the
key findings of the study:
1. The North Carolina statute is moderately efficient in producing consistent and
predictable capital sentencing results across all cases.
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2. The North Carolina statute is highly efficient in producing consistent and
predictable capital sentencing results for Black defendants, particularly as to
death sentences.
3. The North Carolina statute is not efficient in producing consistent and
predictable capital sentencing results for White defendants.
4. Black defendants pay a significantly higher premium in terms of the risk of a
death sentence for increases in the level of aggravation a jury accepts.
5. Black defendants pay a significantly higher premium in terms of the risk of a
death sentence where the murder for pecuniary gain, HAC, and prior violent
felony record aggravators are accepted.
6. Black defendants pay the highest premium in terms of the risk of a death
sentence where their victim was White.
7. The race of the victim makes no statistically significant difference in the risk
of receiving the death penalty, except where the defendant is Black and the
victim is White.
8. Jury acceptance and application of aggravating circumstances has a much
stronger influence on sentencing outcomes, regardless of defendant or victim
race, than jury acceptance and application of mitigating circumstances.
9. There is no statistically significant race-based difference in the effect of an
increase in the mitigation level of a case.
10. There is no statistically significant difference in the mitigatory effect of
individual factors based on victim race.
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11. Only two mitigatory factors were significantly different based on defendant
race: The lack of a significant prior record decreases the risk of a death
sentence more for White defendants versus Black defendants; and jury
acceptance that the defendant acted under duress favors Black defendants.
These results indicate that while the North Carolina statute appears to working
efficiently overall, there is a statistically significant bias against Black defendants in
terms of how aggravating circumstances affect their risk of a death sentence, regardless
of the race of their victim, over White defendants whose crimes are comparably
aggravated. Where levels of aggravation and mitigation are controlled for, Black
defendants are three (3) times more likely to receive the death penalty than White
defendants. When looking at the individual aggravators accepted, the odds multipliers
increase significantly for Black defendants over White, with HAC – the most subjective
aggravator – having a very significantly larger effect for Black defendants, and an
enormous effect if the victim was white, compared to White defendants who kill white
victims in a heinous, atrocious or cruel way. These disparities are statistically significant
at p < .05, but whether they are enough to demonstrate constitutional significance is
unknown.
The analysis shows little, if any, disparity in how the North Carolina statute was
applied which can be attributed to the race of the victim. The only statistically significant
difference possibly attributable to a race-of-victim effect was the enhanced aggravation
effect on Black defendants whose victims were White over the effect on White
defendants whose victims were White, but this appears more of a race-of-defendant effect
than a race of victim effect because: 1) there was no statistically significant difference
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between the way jury-accepted aggravators and mitigators affected a defendant’s
sentencing outcome based on the victim’s race, except between White and Black
defendants whose victims were White; and 2) there was no statistically significant
difference in how the aggravators influenced sentencing outcomes for Black defendants,
period – regardless of the race of their victim.
The comparison of the White defendant-White victim and Black defendant–White
victim models produced the largest disparities, thus confirming the fears about Black-onWhite murders expressed in Turner and McClesky. The Black defendant who killed a
White victim was at the highest risk overall, with an odds multiplier 3.5 times higher
[9.883] as for a White defendant who killed a White victim [2.782]. Where the victim
was White and the HAC aggravator was accepted, a Black defendants’ risk of a death
sentence was 18.5 times higher than White defendants in the same situation, and if the
prior violent felony aggravator was present the risk was 69 times higher for Black
defendants than White. McCleskey did not find a 4 point disparity in the race-of-victim
effect sufficient to raise Eighth Amendment concerns as to McCleskey’s individual
sentence. Whether the disparities shown in the study presented here are or are not
constitutionally significant as showing unacceptable jury bias, arbitrary and capricious
sentencing or a violation of substantive due process requirements of racial parity in death
sentencing in either an individual or systemic context, is unknown, but the statistical
significance and the consistency of these disparities raise a question of whether the death
sentence can ever be fair in a Black-on-White crime.
The model fit values underscore the apparent race-of-defendant disparity in how
the Furman standards have been applied in North Carolina. The all-case model indicates
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that the North Carolina sentencing statute is working moderately well overall, with jury
acceptance and application of the aggravating and mitigating factors to crimes within
comparable aggravation and mitigation ranges explaining 41% of variance in sentencing
outcomes, rising to 52% when parsed into individual aggravator and mitigator effects.
The defendant race-specific models increase the fit for Black defendants over the allcases models to 45% of the variance in outcome based on aggravation/mitigation levels
and 63% in the individual factor models, compared to a slight decrease in fit from the allcases model for White defendants to 39% but an increase over the all-cases model where
individual factors were used to 59%.
The victim race-specific aggravation/mitigation level models are not far apart in
their fit – the Black victim model explained about 40% of the variance and the White
victim model 42% of the variance. When individual factors are used, however, the fit
becomes slightly better for Black victim cases than White, explaining 61% of the
variance in Black victim cases, and 57% in White victim cases. The racial combination
models reported at Tables 2 and 5 also demonstrate higher model efficiency for Black
defendants than White. The fit for the level of aggravation/mitigation models decreases
from the all-cases model in the White-on-White sub-sample indicating only 38% of the
variance in sentencing outcomes is explained; evidence that aggravation/mitigation levels
operate less efficiently in predicting sentencing outcomes for White defendants.
Where individual factors are used, however, the model fit increases to nearly 60%
(R2=.598) The fit increases for Black defendants, regardless of the race of the victim,
across all models, reaching the best fit in the Black defendant-White victim cases where
the aggravation/mitigation level model explains 52% of the variance, and the individual
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factor model explains almost 80% (R2=.795). This is a much higher level of predictive
efficiency than the 50% value rejected in McCleskey.
Implications of Findings, Limitations of Study, and Need for Additional Research
The primary implication of these findings is that it does not appear that the
Furman approach has eliminated race-based arbitrariness under the Eighth Amendment,
at least as to the operation of death sentencing procedures in North Carolina. The
statistically significant differences in how juries have applied the North Carolina statute
to Black and White defendants cannot reasonably be attributed completely to non-racial
factors, and may reasonably be accepted as evidence of arbitrariness founded in
unconscious juror racial bias which somehow works in favor of White defendants and
against Black defendants.
The statute is much less efficient in predicting death sentences for White
defendants than for Black. Whether this is the product of unconscious juror bias in
weighing the seriousness of the aggravating factors when the defendant is Black, or
unconscious bias as to the mitigatory effects favoring White defendants can’t be
determined. What can be said is that there appears to be inequity, probably race-based, in
how the North Carolina juries apply the North Carolina sentencing statutes to Black
defendants.
Whether the racial disparities observed in this study reach the level of
constitutional significance referenced in McCleskey remains to be seen, but seem
sufficiently significant to warrant further research to determine whether there is a basis
for an Eighth Amendment challenge to the North Carolina statute. Moreover, if it is
assumed that these results are caused by the unconscious racial attitudes of jurors
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impossible to detect or eliminate through procedural safeguards and curable only by time,
then the Sixth Amendment issue is raised: What if it is impossible to select a racially
impartial jury in North Carolina because of lingering cultural racial biases? How much,
if any, demonstrated racial disparity in jury decisionmaking equals ‘impartiality’
violative of the Sixth Amendment? The results here thus also support a Sixth
Amendment challenge to the North Carolina sentencing statute.
Finally, if it is impossible to eliminate racial disparity in the imposition of the
death penalty -- or at least reduce it to insignificant levels -- because it is the product of
unconscious social/cultural attitudes, a substantive due process issue is raised. Is it an
infringement on liberty interests to allow the happenstance of a person’s race to influence
in any significant way whether he lives or dies, regardless of his crime? There would
seem to be a substantive liberty interest, arising out of constitutional guarantees of due
process, to be free from significant racial discrimination period, in the operation of law,
as much as there is to be free from purposeful racial discrimination, certainly where the
result is death. Thus this study provides a possible basis for a claim of denial of
substantive due process to Black defendants sentenced to death in North Carolina.
It must be stressed again, however, that a statistical analysis such as the one
presented here is likely not to be found acceptable to prove a claim requiring specific or
implied intent to discriminate, as is necessary in an individual equal protection claim
seeking individual relief like the McCleskey case. An analysis such as this could be used
to seek blanket relief from further operation of a specific statute, including enjoining
further executions based on sentences produced from the challenged statute.
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Further research is needed. The study is limited, intentionally, to the FurmanGregg factors as applied in North Carolina and does not take into account the possible
influence of other case characteristics such as urban-rural effects, type of attorney,
specific victim vulnerability factors such as age, gender or disability which could also
account for the unexplained variance. It is possible that an analysis of aggravator and
mitigator submission-rejection patterns could bolster or call into question the conclusion
that racial bias is influencing sentencing outcomes. Small sub-set sample sizes may also
have confounded the effects. Finally, without another state’s sentencing outcome data to
compare, it is not possible to conclude from this study that the Furman approach has not
reduced racial inequity in capital sentencing anywhere, because the study is limited to
North Carolina’s statute and North Carolina sentencing outcomes. The results raise a red
flag, however, and the study offers a valid approach to legal arguments about the lack of
racial invariance in death sentencing under Furman v. Georgia.
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